Rethinking the No Detention Policy

Policy

Rethinking the No Detention Policy

Nivedita Rao - September 19, 2017 Comments

In India, children in the age group of 6-14 years have the right to free and compulsory elementary education in a neighbourhood school under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009. This covers primary (classes 1-5) and upper primary (classes 6-8) levels, which collectively constitute elementary education.

Amongst several provisions focused on elementary education, the Act provides for the No Detention Policy. Under this, no child will be detained till the completion of elementary education in class 8. The RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017, introduced recently, revisits the No Detention Policy. In light of this, we discuss the No Detention Policy and issues affecting the implementation of RTE.

What is the No Detention Policy?

The rationale for the No Detention Policy or automatic promotion to the next class is minimising dropouts, making learning joyful, and removing the fear of failure in exams.[1] The evaluation mechanism under the Policy is the Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) for holistic assessments (e.g., paper-pencil test, drawing and reading pictures, and expressing orally) as opposed to the traditional system of examinations. CCE does not mean no evaluation, but it means an evaluation of a different kind from the traditional system of examinations.

What does the RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017 propose to do?

The Bill proposes a ‘regular examination’ which will be held in class 5 and class 8 at the end of every academic year.[2] In the event that a child fails these examinations, he will be given remedial instruction and the opportunity for a re-examination.

If he fails in the re-examination, the central or state governments may choose: (i) to not detain the child at all, or (ii) to detain the child in class 5, class 8, or in both classes. This is in contrast to the current Policy where a child cannot be detained until the completion of class 8.

Conversation around the No Detention Policy

Following the implementation of the No Detention Policy, experts have recommended rolling it back partially or fully. The reasons for this reconsideration include: (i) the lack of preparedness of the education system to support the Policy, (ii) automatic promotion disincentivising children from working hard, (iii) low accountability of teachers, (iv) low learning outcomes, and (iii) the lack of proper implementation of CCE and its integration with teacher training.¹^,[3],[4]

In 2015, all the states were asked to share their views on the No Detention Policy. Most of the states suggested modifications to the Policy in its current form.

What do the numbers say?

Consequent to the enactment of RTE, enrolment has been 100% at the primary level (see Figure 1). While enrolment has been universal (100%) at the primary level, low transition of students from one class to another at progressively higher levels has been noted. This has resulted in high dropouts at the secondary education level, with the highest dropout rate being 17% at the class 10 level (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Enrolment in elementary education (2005-2014)

Sources: Education Statistics at a Glance, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2016; PRS.
Note: Enrolment over 100 % as seen in primary education signifies that children below and above the age of six are being enrolled at the primary education level.

One of the reasons for low dropouts at the elementary level may be the obligation to automatically promote and not detain children under the No Detention Policy. However, there is no such obligation on the government to provide for the same post class 9 i.e., in secondary education. The reasons which explain the rise in dropouts at the secondary level include domestic activities for girls and economic activities for boys, reasons common to both include financial constraints and lack of interest in education.[5]

Figure 2: Dropout rates in school education (2014-15)

Sources: Flash Statistics, District Information System for Education, 2015-16; PRS.

How does RTE ensure quality education?

Based on the high enrolment and low dropout rates in elementary education, it can be inferred that children are being retained in schools for longer. However, there have been some adverse observations regarding the learning outcomes of such children. For example, the Economic Survey 2015-16 pointed out that only about 42% of students in class 5 (in government schools) are able to read a class 2 text. This number has in fact declined from 57% in 2007.^[6] The National Achievement Survey (2015) for class 5 has also revealed that performance of students, on an average, had gone down from the previous round of the survey conducted in 2014.^[7]

Key reasons attributed to low learning levels are with regard to teacher training and high vacancies.⁷^,[8],[9] Against a total of 19 lakh teacher positions sanctioned under Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan in 2011-12, only 12 lakh were filled. Further, approximately 4.5 lakh untrained teachers were operating in 19 states. Teacher training institutes such as District Institutes of Education and Training are also experiencing high vacancies with regard to trainers who train teachers.^[10]

It has also been noted that the presence of contract/temporary teachers, instead of permanent teachers, contributes to the deterioration of quality of education. In fact, experts have recommended that to ensure quality secondary education, the reliance on contract/temporary teachers must be done away with. Instead, fully qualified teachers with salary and benefits must be hired.^[11] It has also been recommended that teachers should not be burdened with ancillary tasks of supervising cooking and serving of mid-day meals.¹⁰

The RTE Act, 2009 sought to ensure that teachers acquire minimum qualifications for their appointment, within five years of its enactment (i.e. till March 31, 2015). Earlier this year, another Bill was introduced in Parliament to amend this provision under the Act. The Bill seeks to extend this deadline until 2019.

In sum, currently there are two Bills seeking to amend the RTE Act, which are pending in Parliament. It remains to be seen, how they impact the implementation of the Act going forward.

[1] “Report of CABE Sub Committee on Assessment on implementation of CCE and no detention provision”, 2015, Ministry of Human Resource Development, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/AssmntCCE.pdf

[2] The RTE (Second Amendment) Bill, 2017.

[3] Change in No-Detention Policy, Ministry of Human Resource Development, March 9, 2017, Press Information Bureau.

[4] Unstarred question no. 1789, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Rajya Sabha, December 1, 2016.

[5] “Key Indicators of Social Consumption in India: Education”, NSS 71^st Round, 2014, http://mail.mospi.gov.in/index.php/catalog/160/related_materials

[6] Economic Survey 2015-16, Ministry of Finance, http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2016-2017/es2014-15/echapter-vol2.pdf

[7] National Achievement Survey, Class V (Cycle 3) Subject Wise Reports, 2014, http://www.ncert.nic.in/departments/nie/esd/pdf/NationalReport_subjectwise.pdf

[8] “253rd Report: Demands for Grants 2013-14, Demand No. 57”, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, April 26, 2013, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/253.pdf

[9] “285^th Report: Action Taken Report on 250^th Report on Demands for Grants 2016-17”, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, December 16, 2016, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/285.pdf

[10] “283^rd Report: The Implementation of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and Mid-Day-Meal Scheme’, Department of School Education and Literacy, Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, December 15, 2016, http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/283.pdf

[11] “Report of the CABE Committee on Girls’ education and common school system”, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2005, http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/document-reports/Girls%20Education.pdf

Recent rise in LPG prices

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Anurag Vaishnav - February 20, 2020 Comments

Last week, oil-marketing companies (or OMCs, such as Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) raised the price of domestic LPG in the country. [1] The price of a domestic cylinder (14.2kg) has increased from Rs 714 in January 2020 to Rs 858.5 in February 2020. This is a 20% hike in the price of a LPG cylinder. Note that this is the sixth consecutive month for which LPG prices have been revised upwards. Figure 1 shows the variation in price of a domestic (non-subsidised) LPG cylinder in Delhi over the last year.

Figure 1: Variation in price of non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder

Sources: Indian Oil and Corporation Limited; PRS.

How is the price of LPG cylinders determined?

LPG prices are revised every month. The price is determined by public sector OMCs namely, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, in line with the changes in the international market prices and other market conditions. [2] The international market price affects the import parity price of petroleum products (the price that importers pay for import of product at the respective Indian ports). This includes exchange rate, ocean freight, insurance and customs duty among others.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has stated that the recent hike in the price of LPG cylinder is due to a sharp rise in international LPG prices during January 2020 (from USD 448/Metric Tonne to USD 567/Metric Tonne). [3]

What is the difference between the price of a subsidised and non-subsidised cylinder?

The price determined by the OMCs reflects the price of a non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder. The government modulates the effective price to provide subsidised LPG cylinders to consumers under the 'Pratyaksha Hastaantarit Laabh' direct benefit transfer (or DBT-PAHAL) scheme. [4] Under the scheme, a consumer (with annual income of up to Rs 10 lakh) can avail DBT cash-subsidy for a LPG cylinder. The beneficiaries buy LPG cylinders at market rate and subsequently receive subsidy directly in their bank accounts.

With the recent increase in price of a LPG cylinder, the government has increased the subsidy amount for PAHAL consumers from Rs. 153.86 per cylinder to Rs. 291.48 per cylinder (89% increase).³ This is done to ensure that the subsidized LPG consumers are insulated from the volatility of LPG prices in the international market. Table 1 shows the amount of subsidy provided by the government for LPG cylinder. Note that price of a subsidised cylinder has increased from Rs 494 to Rs 567 (14.8%) from February 2019 to February 2020.

Table 1: Difference between the price of subsidised and non-subsidised LPG cylinder

As on	Non-subsidised cylinder	Subsidised cylinder	Subsidy
February 2018	Rs 736.00	Rs 495.63	Rs 240.37
February 2019	Rs 659.00	Rs 493.53	Rs 165.47
February 2020	Rs 858.50	Rs 567.02	Rs 291.48

Sources: Unstarred Question No.1211, February 13, 2019, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Rajya Sabha.
Note: Prices are at Delhi.

How many people avail the subsidy on LPG cylinders?

Currently, there are a total of 27.16 crore LPG (domestic) connections in the country.³ Of these, 26.12 crore (94%) consumers are beneficiaries under the PAHAL scheme, and therefore, can avail LPG cylinders at subsidised rates. Note that, under the scheme, a maximum of 12 subsidised cylinders per year can be availed under one connection. Further, a household cannot have more than one connection.

What is the cost of subsidy for the government?

The subsidy on domestic LPG is met through the budgetary grants of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. In 2020-21, the government is estimated to spend Rs 37,256 crore on LPG subsidy. This includes Rs 35,605 crore for DBT-PAHAL and Rs 1,118 crore for Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana. This is an increase of 9.3% from the expenditure in 2019-20 of Rs 34,086 crore (revised estimate). Note that LPG subsidy constitutes 87% of the Ministry's total budget (Rs 42,901 crore).

Figure 2 below shows the year-wise expenditure on LPG subsidy, and as a proportion of the total budget of the Ministry from 2015-16 to 2020-21.

Figure 2: LPG subsidy over the years (2015-16 to 2020-21).

Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.

For more trends and analysis related to the finances of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, see here.

[1] "LPG price hiked by Rs 144.5 per cylinder", Economic Times, February 12, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/lpg-price-hiked-by-rs-144-5-per-cylinder/articleshow/74096745.cms.

[2] Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, https://www.ppac.gov.in/content/137_3_Faq.aspx.

[3] "LPG Price is Derived based on International Market Price", Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, February 13, 2020.

[4] PAHAL-Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG (DBTL) Consumers Scheme, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, http://petroleum.nic.in/dbt/whatisdbtl.html.

Union Budget 2020-21: Are the fiscal targets realistic?

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Gayatri Mann and Suyash Tiwari - February 6, 2020 Comments

Today, a general discussion on the Union Budget 2020-21 is being held in both Houses of Parliament. In the budget, the government presented the estimates of the money it expects to spend on various ministries, and how much money will be raised from different sources such as levy of taxes and dividends from public enterprises in 2020-21. In addition, the budget presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2019-20 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government actually raised and spent in 2018-19.

What are revised estimates?

Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.

For instance, estimates for the year 2019-20 were presented as part of the 2019-20 budget in July 2019. In the 2020-21 budget (February 2020), the government presented 2019-20’s revised estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and estimations made for the remaining 2-3 months.

Is there a way to find out the government’s actual receipts or expenditure mid-year?

The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. On January 31, 2020, the CGA updated the accounts figures for the period April to December 2019. Thus, we have unaudited actuals for the first nine months of the financial year.

How do the actual figures for the year 2019-20 so far compare with the revised estimates?

Table 1 gives the revised estimates presented by the central government for the year 2019-20 and the monthly account figures maintained by the CGA for the nine-month period April to December 2019. The difference between these two figures gives us the three-month target that the government will have to meet by March 2020 to reach its revised estimates.

Till December 2019, the government has spent Rs 21.1 lakh crore, which is 78% of the revised estimates for 2019-20. While the expenditure has reached 78% of the target, so far, the government has been able to generate only Rs 11.8 lakh crore or 61% of the receipts (excluding borrowings) for the year 2019-20. This implies that the receipts will have to grow at a rate of 41% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the revised estimates of Rs 19.3 lakh crore. So far, receipts have grown at a rate of 4%.

Table 1: Budget at a Glance – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Budget at a Glance	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Budget at a Glance	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Revenue Expenditure	20,07,399	23,49,645	18,54,125	4,95,520	14%	28%
Capital Expenditure	3,07,714	3,48,907	2,55,522	93,385	21%	-3%
Total Expenditure	23,15,113	26,98,552	21,09,647	5,88,905	15%	22%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%
Capital Receipts	1,12,779	81,605	31,025	50,580	-33%	-24%
of which Disinvestment	94,727	65,000	18,100	46,900	-47%	-22%
Total Receipts (without borrowings)	16,65,695	19,31,706	11,77,922	7,53,784	4%	41%
Revenue Deficit	4,54,483	4,99,544	7,07,228	-2,07,684
Fiscal Deficit	6,49,418	7,66,846	9,31,725	-1,64,879
Primary Deficit	66,770	1,41,741	5,07,411	-3,65,670

Sources: Union Budget 2020-21; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

How do the actual tax receipts fare in comparison to the revised estimates of 2019-20?

A lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP has also affected the tax receipts of the government during the year. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20. The revised estimates for 2019-20 show gross tax receipts of Rs 21.6 lakh crore (includes states’ share). Till December 2019, tax receipts of Rs 13.8 lakh crore has been collected, which is 64% of the target. The tax receipts will have to grow at 19% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the target. Table 2 shows similar comparison for the various taxes and also for the tax receipts devolved to states. While the budget estimated a growth in receipts from all major taxes, receipts from taxes such as corporation tax (-14%), union excise duties (-2%), and customs (-12%) have declined during the period Apr-Dec 2019.

Table 2: Tax receipts – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Revenue Receipts	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Revenue Receipts	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Gross Tax Revenue	20,80,465	21,63,423	13,83,035	7,80,388	-3%	19%
Devolution to States	7,61,454	6,56,046	4,76,113	1,79,933	-2%	-34%
Net Tax Revenue	13,17,211	15,04,587	9,04,944	5,99,643	-3%	57%
Dividend and Profits	1,13,420	1,99,893	1,61,979	37,914	175%	-30%
Other Non-tax Revenue	1,22,284	1,45,620	79,974	65,646	-10%	96%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%

Note: Figures for income tax exclude receipts from the Securities Transaction Tax.

Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

If we look at sources of receipts other than taxes, non-tax revenue during Apr-Dec 2019 is Rs 2.4 lakh crore, i.e. 69% of the estimated Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Disinvestment receipts till date amounted to Rs 18,100 crore, i.e. 17% of the budget target of Rs 1.05 lakh crore. Though the investment target has been revised down to Rs 65,000 crore, it implies that Rs 47,000 crore would need to be raised in the next two months.

How does this impact the borrowings of the government?

When the expenditure planned by the government is more than its receipts, the government finances this gap through borrowings. This gap is known as fiscal deficit and equals the borrowings required to be made for that year. Given lower than expected receipts, the government has had to borrow more money than it had planned for. Borrowings or fiscal deficit of the government, till December 2019, stands at Rs 9.3 lakh crore, which is 22% higher than the revised estimate of Rs 7.7 lakh crore. Note that with three months still remaining in the financial year, fiscal deficit may further increase, in case receipts are less than expenditure.

When we look at fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, the 2019-20 budget estimated the fiscal deficit to be at 3.3% of GDP. This has been revised upward to 3.8% of GDP. However, till December 2019, fiscal deficit for the year 2019-20 stands at 4.6% of GDP (taking the latest available GDP figures into account, i.e. the First Advance Estimates for 2019-20 released in January 2020). This increase in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is because of two reasons: (i) an increase in borrowings as compared to the budget estimates, and (ii) a decrease in GDP as compared to the estimate made in the budget. The latter is due to a lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP for the year 2019-20. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.

Note that, in addition to the expenditure shown in the budget, the government also spends through extra budgetary resources. These resources are raised by issuing bonds and through loans from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). The revised estimates for 2019-20 show an expenditure of Rs 1,72,699 crore through such extra-budgetary resources. This includes an expenditure of Rs 1,10,000 crore by the Food Corporation of India financed through loans from NSSF. Since funds borrowed for such expenditure remain outside the budget, they do not get factored in the deficit and debt figures. If borrowings made in the form of extra-budgetary resources are also taken into account, the fiscal deficit estimated for the year 2019-20 would increase from 3.8% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP due to extra-budgetary borrowings of Rs 1,72,699 crore. This does not account for further slippage if the targeted revenue does not materialise.

Rethinking the No Detention Policy

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