Central Transfers to States: Role of the Finance Commission

Policy

Central Transfers to States: Role of the Finance Commission

Gayatri Mann - April 11, 2018 Comments

In November 2017, the 15^th Finance Commission (Chair: Mr N. K. Singh) was constituted to give recommendations on the transfer of resources from the centre to states for the five year period between 2020-25. In recent times, there has been some discussion around the role and mandate of the Commission. In this context, we explain the role of the Finance Commission.

What is the Finance Commission?

The Finance Commission is a constitutional body formed every five years to give suggestions on centre-state financial relations. Each Finance Commission is required to make recommendations on: (i) sharing of central taxes with states, (ii) distribution of central grants to states, (iii) measures to improve the finances of states to supplement the resources of panchayats and municipalities, and (iv) any other matter referred to it.

Composition of transfers: The central taxes devolved to states are untied funds, and states can spend them according to their discretion. Over the years, tax devolved to states has constituted over 80% of the total central transfers to states (Figure 1). The centre also provides grants to states and local bodies which must be used for specified purposes. These grants have ranged between 12% to 19% of the total transfers.

Fig 1 Over the years the core mandate of the Commission has remained unchanged, though it has been given the additional responsibility of examining various issues. For instance, the 12^th Finance Commission evaluated the fiscal position of states and offered relief to those that enacted their Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management laws. The 13^th and the 14^th Finance Commissionassessed the impact of GST on the economy. The 13^th Finance Commission also incentivised states to increase forest cover by providing additional grants.

15^th Finance Commission: The 15^th Finance Commission constituted in November 2017 will recommend central transfers to states. It has also been mandated to: (i) review the impact of the 14th Finance Commission recommendations on the fiscal position of the centre; (ii) review the debt level of the centre and states, and recommend a roadmap; (iii) study the impact of GST on the economy; and (iv) recommend performance-based incentives for states based on their efforts to control population, promote ease of doing business, and control expenditure on populist measures, among others.

Why is there a need for a Finance Commission?

The Indian federal system allows for the division of power and responsibilities between the centre and states. Correspondingly, the taxation powers are also broadly divided between the centre and states (Table 1). State legislatures may devolve some of their taxation powers to local bodies.

Table 1

The centre collects majority of the tax revenue as it enjoys scale economies in the collection of certain taxes. States have the responsibility of delivering public goods in their areas due to their proximity to local issues and needs.

Sometimes, this leads to states incurring expenditures higher than the revenue generated by them. Further, due to vast regional disparities some states are unable to raise adequate resources as compared to others. To address these imbalances, the Finance Commission recommends the extent of central funds to be shared with states. Prior to 2000, only revenue income tax and union excise duty on certain goods was shared by the centre with states. A Constitution amendment in 2000 allowed for all central taxes to be shared with states.

Several other federal countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Australia have similar bodies which recommend the manner in which central funds will be shared with states.

Tax devolution to states

Table 2 The 14th Finance Commission considerably increased the devolution of taxes from the centre to states from 32% to 42%. The Commission had recommended that tax devolution should be the primary source of transfer of funds to states. This would increase the flow of unconditional transfers and give states more flexibility in their spending.

The share in central taxes is distributed among states based on a formula. Previous Finance Commissions have considered various factors to determine the criteria such as the population and income needs of states, their area and infrastructure, etc. Further, the weightage assigned to each criterion has varied with each Finance Commission.

The criteria used by the 11^th to 14^thFinance Commissions are given in Table 2, along with the weight assigned to them. State level details of the criteria used by the 14th Finance Commission are given in Table 3.

Population is an indicator of the expenditure needs of a state. Over the years, Finance Commissions have used population data of the 1971 Census. The 14^th Finance Commission used the 2011 population data, in addition to the 1971 data. The 15^th Finance Commission has been mandated to use data from the 2011 Census.
Area is used as a criterion as a state with larger area has to incur additional administrative costs to deliver services.
Income distance is the difference between the per capita income of a state with the average per capita income of all states. States with lower per capita income may be given a higher share to maintain equity among states.
Forest cover indicates that states with large forest covers bear the cost of not having area available for other economic activities. Therefore, the rationale is that these states may be given a higher share.

Table 3

Grants-in-Aid

Besides the taxes devolved to states, another source of transfers from the centre to states is grants-in-aid. As per the recommendations of the 14^th Finance Commission, grants-in-aid constitute 12% of the central transfers to states. The 14^th Finance Commission had recommended grants to states for three purposes: (i) disaster relief, (ii) local bodies, and (iii) revenue deficit.

Examining urban local governance in India through the case of Bengaluru

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Prachi Kaur and Shruti Gupta - December 24, 2020 Comments

Recently, the Karnataka legislature passed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Bill, 2020. BBMP is the municipal corporation of the Greater Bengaluru metropolitan area. The BBMP Act, 2020 seeks to improve decentralisation, ensure public participation, and address certain administrative and structural concerns in Bengaluru. In this blog, we discuss some common issues in urban local governance in India, in the context of Bengaluru’s municipal administration.

The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 provided for the establishment of urban local bodies (ULBs) (including municipal corporations) as institutions of local self-government. It also empowered state governments to devolve certain functions, authority, and power to collect revenue to these bodies, and made periodic elections for them compulsory.

Urban governance is part of the state list under the Constitution. Thus, the administrative framework and regulation of ULBs varies across states. However, experts have highlighted that ULBs across India face similar challenges. For instance, ULBs across the country lack autonomy in city management and several city-level functions are managed by parastatals (managed by and accountable to the state). Several taxation powers have also not been devolved to these bodies, leading to stressed municipal finances. These challenges have led to poor service delivery in cities and also created administrative and governance challenges at the municipal level.

BBMP was established under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (KMC Act). The BBMP Act, 2020 replaces provisions of the KMC Act, 1976 in its application to Bengaluru. It adds a new level of zonal committees to the existing three-tier municipal structure in the city, and also gives the Corporation some more taxation powers. Certain common issues in urban local governance in India, with provisions related to them in the BBMP Act, 2020 are given below.

Functional overlap with parastatals for key functions

The Constitution (74^th Amendment) Act, 1992 empowered states to devolve the responsibility of 18 functions including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, and slum upgradation to ULBs. However, in most Indian cities including Bengaluru, a majority of these functions are carried out by parastatals. For example, in Bengaluru, the Bengaluru Development Authority is responsible for land regulation and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board is responsible for slum rehabilitation.

The BBMP Act, 2020 provides the Corporation with the power and responsibility to prepare and implement schemes for the 18 functions provided for in the Constitution (74^th Amendment) Act, 1992. However, it does not provide clarity if new bodies at the municipal level will be created, or the existing parastatals will continue to perform these functions and if so, whether their accountability will shift from the state to the municipal corporation.

This could create a two-fold challenge in administration. First, if there are multiple agencies performing similar functions, it could lead to a functional overlap, ambiguity, and wastage of resources. Second, and more importantly, the presence of parastatals that are managed by and accountable to the state government leads to an erosion of the ULB’s autonomy. Several experts have highlighted that this lack of autonomy faced by municipal corporations in most Indian cities leads to a challenge in governance, effective service delivery, and development of urban areas.

An Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) had recommended that activity mapping should be done for the 18 functions. Under this, functions in the exclusive domain of municipalities and those which need to be shared with the state and the central government must be specified. Experts have also recommended that the municipality should be responsible for providing civic amenities in its jurisdiction and if a parastatal exercises a civic function, it should be accountable to the municipality.

Stressed municipal finances

Indian ULBs are amongst the weakest in the world in terms of fiscal autonomy and have limited effective devolution of revenue. They also have limited capacity to raise resources through their own sources of revenue such as property tax. Municipal revenue in India accounts for only one percent of the GDP (2017-18). This leads to a dependence on transfers by the state and central government.

ULBs in states like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Haryana are in poor financial condition. This has been attributed to limited powers to raise revenue and levy taxes, and problems in the management of existing resources. For instance, the finances of Bihar’s ULBs were assessed to be poor because of: (i) delays in release of grants, (ii) inadequate devolution of funds, and (iii) delays in revision of tax rates and assessments of landholdings.

In comparison, Karnataka ranks high among Indian states in key indicators for fiscal capacity like collection of property taxes, grants from Central Finance Commissions, and state government transfers. The BBMP Act, 2020 further increases the taxation powers of the Corporation, by allowing it to impose taxes on professions and entertainment.

Experts have recommended that the central government and the respective state government should provide additional funds and facilitate additional funding mechanisms for ULBs to strengthen their finances. The revenue of ULBs can be augmented through measures including assignment of greater powers of taxation to the ULBs by the state government, reforms in land and property-based taxes (such as the use of technology to cover more properties), and issuing of municipal bonds (debt instruments issued by ULBs to finance development projects).

Powers of elected municipal officials

The executive power with state-appointed municipal Commissioners and elected municipal officers differs across states. States like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, and cities like Chennai and Hyderabad vest the executive power in the Commissioner. In contrast, the executive power of the Corporation is exercised by a Mayor-in council (consisting of the Mayor and up to 10 elected members of the Corporation) in Kolkata and Madhya Pradesh. This is unlike large metropolitan cities in other countries like New York and London, where elected Mayors are designated as executive heads. Experts have noted that charging Commissioners with executive power diluted the role of the Mayor and violated the spirit of self-governance.

Under the BBMP Act, 2020, both the elected Mayor and the state-appointed Chief Commissioner exercise several executive functions. The Mayor is responsible for approving contracts and preparing the budget estimate for the Corporation. He is also required to discharge all functions assigned to him by the Corporation. On the other hand, executive functions of the Chief Commissioner include: (i) selling or leasing properties owned by the Corporation, and (ii) regulating and issuing instructions regarding public streets.

The Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) has recommended that the Commissioner should act as a city manager and should be recruited through a transparent search-cum-selection process led by the Mayor. A Model Municipal law, released by the Urban Development Ministry in 2003, provided that the executive power should be exercised by an Empowered Standing Committee consisting of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and seven elected councillors.

Management of staff and human resources

Experts have noted that municipal administration in India suffers from staffing issues which leads to a failure in delivering basic urban services. These include overstaffing of untrained manpower, shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors, and unwillingness to innovate in methods for service delivery.

The BBMP Act, 2020 provides that the Corporation may make bye-laws for the due performance of duties by its employees. However, it does not mention other aspects of human resource management such as recruitment and promotion. A CAG report (2020) looking at the implementation of the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 in Karnataka has observed that the power to assess municipal staff requirements, recruiting such staff, and determining their pay, transfer and promotion vests with the state government. This is in contrast with the recommendations of several experts who have suggested that municipalities should appoint their personnel to ensure accountability, adequate recruitment, and proper management of staff.

Other states including Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu also allow the state governments to regulate recruitment and staffing for ULBs. In cities like Mumbai, and Coimbatore, and some states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, while the recruitment process is conducted by the respective municipal corporations, the final sanction for hiring staff lies with the state government.

Anti-Conversion Legislation: Comparison of the UP Ordinances with other state laws

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Anoop Ramakrishnan - December 17, 2020 Comments

This blog has been updated on Jan 19, 2021 to also cover the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance which was promulgated earlier in the month. The comparison table has also been revised accordingly.

On November 27, 2020, the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020 was promulgated by the state government. This was followed by the Madhya Pradesh (MP) government promulgating the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Ordinance, 2020, in January 2021. These Ordinances seek to regulate religious conversions and prohibit certain types of religious conversions (including through marriages). The MP Ordinance replaces the MP Dharma Swatantra Adhiniyam, 1968, which previously regulated religious conversions in the state. Few other states, including Haryana and Karnataka, are also planning to introduce a similar law. This blog post looks at existing anti-conversion laws in the country and compares the latest UP and MP Ordinances with these laws.

Anti-conversion laws in India

The Constitution guarantees the freedom to profess, propagate, and practise religion, and allows all religious sections to manage their own affairs in matters of religion; subject to public order, morality, and health. To date, there has been no central legislation restricting or regulating religious conversions. Further, in 2015, the Union Law Ministry stated that Parliament does not have the legislative competence to pass anti-conversion legislation. However, it is to be noted that, since 1954, on multiple occasions, Private Member Bills have been introduced in (but never approved by) the Parliament, to regulate religious conversions.

Over the years, several states have enacted ‘Freedom of Religion’ legislation to restrict religious conversions carried out by force, fraud, or inducements. These are: (i) Odisha (1967), (ii) Madhya Pradesh (1968), (iii) Arunachal Pradesh (1978), (iv) Chhattisgarh (2000 and 2006), (v) Gujarat (2003), (vi) Himachal Pradesh (2006 and 2019), (vii) Jharkhand (2017), and (viii) Uttarakhand (2018). Additionally, the Himachal Pradesh (2019) and Uttarakhand legislations also declare a marriage to be void if it was done for the sole purpose of unlawful conversion, or vice-versa. Further, the states of Tamil Nadu (2002) and Rajasthan (2006 and 2008) had also passed similar legislation. However, the Tamil Nadu legislation was repealed in 2006 (after protests by Christian minorities), while in case of Rajasthan, the bills did not receive the Governor’s and President’s assent respectively. Please see Table 2 for a comparison of anti-conversion laws across the country.

In November 2019, citing rising incidents of forced/fraudulent religious conversions, the Uttar Pradesh Law Commission recommended enacting a new law to regulate religious conversions. This led the state government to promulgate the recent Ordinance in 2020. Following UP, the MP government also decided to promulgate an Ordinance in January 2021 to regulate religious conversions. We discuss key features of these ordinances below.

What do the UP and MP Ordinances do?

The MP and UP Ordinances define conversion as renouncing one’s existing religion and adopting another religion. However, both Ordinances exclude re-conversion to immediate previous religion (in UP), and parental religion (in MP) from this definition. Parental religion is the religion to which the individual’s father belonged to, at the time of the individual’s birth. These Ordinances prescribe the procedure for individuals seeking to undergo conversions (in the states of UP and MP) and declare all other forms of conversion (that violate the prescribed procedures) illegal.

Procedure for conversion: Both the Ordinances require: (i) persons wishing to convert to a different religion, and (ii) persons supervising the conversion (religious convertors in UP, and religious priests or persons organising a conversion in MP) to submit an advance declaration of the proposed religious conversion to the District Magistrate (DM). In both states, the individuals seeking to undergo conversion are required to give advance notice of 60 days to the DM. However, in UP, the religious convertors are required to notify one month in advance, whereas in MP, the priests or organisers are also required to notify 60 days in advance. Upon receiving the declarations, the DMs in UP are further required to conduct a police enquiry into the intention, purpose, and cause of the proposed conversion. No such requirement exists in the MP Ordinance, although it mandates the DM’s sanction as a prerequisite for any court to take cognisance of an offence caused by violation of these procedures.

The UP Ordinance also lays down a post-conversion procedure. Post-conversion, within 60 days from the date of conversion, the converted individual is required to submit a declaration (with various personal details) to the DM. The DM will publicly exhibit a copy of the declaration (till the conversion is confirmed) and record any objections to the conversion. The converted individual must then appear before the DM to establish his/her identity, within 21 days of sending the declaration, and confirm the contents of the declaration.

Both the Ordinances also prescribe varying punishments for violation of any procedure prescribed by them, as specified in Table 2.

Prohibition on conversions: Both, the UP and MP Ordinances prohibit conversion of religion through means, such as: (i) force, misrepresentation, undue influence, and allurement, or (ii) fraud, or (iii) marriage. They also prohibit a person from abetting, convincing, and conspiring to such conversions. Further, the Ordinances assign the burden of proof of the lawfulness of religious conversion to: (i) the persons causing or facilitating such conversions, in UP, and (ii) the person accused of causing unlawful conversion, in MP.

Complaints against unlawful conversions: Both Ordinances allow for police complaints, against unlawful religious conversions, to be registered by: (i) the victim of such conversion, (ii) his/her parents or siblings, or (iii) any other person related to them by blood, and marriage or adoption. The MP Ordinance additionally permits persons related by guardianship or custodianship to also register a complaint, provided they take the leave of the court. Further, the MP Ordinance assigns the power to investigate such complaints to police officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector and above.

Marriages involving religious conversion: As per the UP Ordinance, a marriage is liable to be declared null and void, if: (i) it was done for the sole purpose of unlawful conversion, or vice-versa, and (ii) the religious conversion was not done as per the procedure specified in the Ordinance. Similarly, the MP Ordinance declares a marriage null and void, if: (i) it was done with an intent to convert a person, and (ii) the conversion took place through any of the prohibited means specified under the Ordinance. Further, the MP Ordinance explicitly provides for punishment (as specified in Table 2) for the concealment of religion for the purpose of marriage.

Right to inheritance and maintenance: The MP Ordinance additionally provides certain safeguards for women and children. It considers children born out of a marriage involving unlawful religious conversion as legitimate and provides for them to have the right to property of only the father (as per the law governing the inheritance of the father). Further, the Ordinance provides for maintenance to be given to: (i) a woman whose marriage is deemed unlawful under the Ordinance, and (ii) her children born out of such a marriage.

Punishment for unlawful conversions: Both the MP and UP Ordinances provide for punishment for causing or facilitating unlawful religious conversion, as specified in Table 1. Also, all offences under both Ordinances are cognisable and non-bailable.

Additionally, under the UP Ordinance, the accused will be liable to pay compensation of up to five lakh rupees to the victim of conversion and repeat offences will attract double the punishment specified for the respective offence. However, under the MP Ordinance, each repeat offence will attract punishment of a fine, and imprisonment between five and 10 years. Further, it provides for the Session Court to try an accused person, at the same trial, for: (i) an offence under this Ordinance, and (ii) also for other offences he has been charged with, under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Table 1: Punishments prescribed under the UP and MP Ordinances for offences by individuals for causing/facilitating the conversion

Punishment	Uttar Pradesh	Madhya Pradesh
Mass conversion (conversion of two or more persons at the same time)
Term of imprisonment	3-10 years	5-10 years
Fine Amount	Rs 50,000 or more	Rs 1,00,000 or more
Conversion of a minor, woman, or person belonging to SC or ST
Term of imprisonment	2-10 years	2-10 years
Fine Amount	Rs 25,000 or more	Rs 50,000 or more
Any other conversion
Term of imprisonment	1-5 years	1-5 years
Fine Amount	Rs 15,000 or more	Rs 25,000 or more

If any of the above three offences are committed by an organisation, under the UP Ordinance, the registration of the organisation is liable to be cancelled and grants or financial aid from the state government is liable to be discontinued. Under the MP Ordinance, only the registration of such organisations is liable to be cancelled.

Central Transfers to States: Role of the Finance Commission