The Anti-Defection Law Explained

Constitution

The Anti-Defection Law Explained

Vibhor Relhan - December 6, 2017 Comments

On Monday, December 4, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha disqualified two Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (better known as the anti-defection law) for having defected from their party.[1] These members were elected on a Janata Dal (United) ticket. The Madras High Court is also hearing petitions filed by 18 MLAs who were disqualified by the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly in September 2017 under the anti-defection law. Allegations of legislators defecting in violation of the law have been made in several other states including Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Telangana and Uttarakhand in recent years.[2] In this context, we explain the anti-defection law.

What is the anti-defection law?

Aaya Ram Gaya Ram was a phrase that became popular in Indian politics after a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day in 1967. The anti-defection law sought to prevent such political defections which may be due to reward of office or other similar considerations.[3]

The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a petition by any other member of the House. A legislator is deemed to have defected if he either voluntarily gives up the membership of his party or disobeys the directives of the party leadership on a vote. This implies that a legislator defying (abstaining or voting against) the party whip on any issue can lose his membership of the House. The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.

Are there any exceptions under the law?

Yes, legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in certain circumstances. The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who stay with the original party will face disqualification.

Various expert committees have recommended that rather than the Presiding Officer, the decision to disqualify a member should be made by the President (in case of MPs) or the Governor (in case of MLAs) on the advice of the Election Commission.[4] This would be similar to the process followed for disqualification in case the person holds an office of profit (i.e. the person holds an office under the central or state government which carries a remuneration, and has not been excluded in a list made by the legislature).

How has the law been interpreted by the Courts while deciding on related matters?

The Supreme Court has interpreted different provisions of the law. We discuss some of these below.

The phrase ‘Voluntarily gives up his membership’ has a wider connotation than resignation

The law provides for a member to be disqualified if he ‘voluntarily gives up his membership’. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted that in the absence of a formal resignation by the member, the giving up of membership can be inferred by his conduct.[5] In other judgments, members who have publicly expressed opposition to their party or support for another party were deemed to have resigned.[6]

In the case of the two JD(U) MPs who were disqualified from Rajya Sabha on Monday, they were deemed to have ‘voluntarily given up their membership’ by engaging in anti-party activities which included criticizing the party on public forums on multiple occasions, and attending rallies organised by opposition parties in Bihar.[7]

Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review

The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.[8] However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the Presiding Officer gives his order.

In 2015, the Hyderabad High Court, refused to intervene after hearing a petition which alleged that there had been delay by the Telangana Assembly Speaker in acting against a member under the anti-defection law.[9]

Is there a time limit within which the Presiding Officer has to decide?

The law does not specify a time-period for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification plea. Given that courts can intervene only after the Presiding Officer has decided on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has no option but to wait for this decision to be made.

There have been several cases where the Courts have expressed concern about the unnecessary delay in deciding such petitions.[10] In some cases this delay in decision making has resulted in members, who have defected from their parties, continuing to be members of the House. There have also been instances where opposition members have been appointed ministers in the government while still retaining the membership of their original parties in the legislature.[11]

In recent years, opposition MLAs in some states, such as Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, have broken away in small groups gradually to join the ruling party. In some of these cases, more than 2/3^rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party.

In these scenarios, the MLAs were subject to disqualification while defecting to the ruling party in smaller groups. However, it is not clear if they will still face disqualification if the Presiding Officer makes a decision after more than 2/3^rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party. The Telangana Speaker in March 2016 allowed the merger of the TDP Legislature Party in Telangana with the ruling TRS, citing that in total, 80% of the TDP MLAs (12 out of 15) had joined the TRS at the time of taking the decision.[12]

In Andhra Pradesh, legislators of the main opposition party recently boycotted the entire 12-day assembly session. This boycott was in protest against the delay of over 18 months in action being taken against legislators of their party who have allegedly defected to the ruling party.[13] The Vice President, in his recent order disqualifying two JD(U) members stated that all such petitions should be decided by the Presiding Officers within a period of around three months.

Does the anti-defection law affect the ability of legislators to make decisions?

The anti-defection law seeks to provide a stable government by ensuring the legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also restricts a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgement and interests of his electorate. Such a situation impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the government, by ensuring that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not what their constituents would like them to vote for.

Political parties issue a direction to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue. Several experts have suggested that the law should be valid only for those votes that determine the stability of the government (passage of the annual budget or no-confidence motions).[14]

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[1] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066 and http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57067.

[2] MLA Defection Politics Not New, Firstpost, March 13, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-forms-govt-in-goa-manipur-mla-defection-politics-not-new-telangana-ap-perfected-it-3331872.html.

[3] The Constitution (52^nd Amendment) Act, 1985, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend52.htm.

[4] Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdfand the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm.

[5] Ravi Naik vs Union of India, 1994, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/554446/.

[6] G.Viswanathan Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras& Another, 1996, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093980/ and Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620629/ and Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.

[7] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.

[8] Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachilhu and Others, 1992, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1686885/.

[9] Sabotage of Anti-Defection Law in Telangana, 2015, https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/50/commentary/sabotage-anti-defection-law-telangana.html.

[10] Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors., 2012, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45034065/ and Mayawati Vs Markandeya Chand & Ors., 1998, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1801522/.

[11] Anti-Defecton Law Ignored, November 30, 2017, http://www.news18.com/news/politics/anti-defection-law-ignored-as-mlas-defect-to-tdp-trs-in-andhra-pradesh-and-telangana-1591319.htmland It’s official Minister Talasani is still a TDP Member, March 27, 2015, http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Telangana/2015-03-27/Its-Official-Minister-Talasani-is-still-a-TDP-member/140135.

[12] Telangana Legislative Assembly Bulletin, March 10, 2016, http://www.telanganalegislature.org.in/documents/10656/19317/Assembly+Buletin.PDF/a0d4bb52-9acf-494f-80e7-3a16e3480460; 12 TDP MLAs merged with TRS, March 11, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/12-tdp-mlas-merged-with-trs/article8341018.ece.

[13] The line TD leaders dare not cross, December 4, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/the-line-td-leaders-dare-not-cross/article21257521.ece

[14] Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm, Report of the Committee on electoral reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf and Law Commission (170th report), 1999, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm.

Recent rise in LPG prices

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Anurag Vaishnav - February 20, 2020 Comments

Last week, oil-marketing companies (or OMCs, such as Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) raised the price of domestic LPG in the country. [1] The price of a domestic cylinder (14.2kg) has increased from Rs 714 in January 2020 to Rs 858.5 in February 2020. This is a 20% hike in the price of a LPG cylinder. Note that this is the sixth consecutive month for which LPG prices have been revised upwards. Figure 1 shows the variation in price of a domestic (non-subsidised) LPG cylinder in Delhi over the last year.

Figure 1: Variation in price of non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder

Sources: Indian Oil and Corporation Limited; PRS.

How is the price of LPG cylinders determined?

LPG prices are revised every month. The price is determined by public sector OMCs namely, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, in line with the changes in the international market prices and other market conditions. [2] The international market price affects the import parity price of petroleum products (the price that importers pay for import of product at the respective Indian ports). This includes exchange rate, ocean freight, insurance and customs duty among others.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has stated that the recent hike in the price of LPG cylinder is due to a sharp rise in international LPG prices during January 2020 (from USD 448/Metric Tonne to USD 567/Metric Tonne). [3]

What is the difference between the price of a subsidised and non-subsidised cylinder?

The price determined by the OMCs reflects the price of a non-subsidised domestic LPG cylinder. The government modulates the effective price to provide subsidised LPG cylinders to consumers under the 'Pratyaksha Hastaantarit Laabh' direct benefit transfer (or DBT-PAHAL) scheme. [4] Under the scheme, a consumer (with annual income of up to Rs 10 lakh) can avail DBT cash-subsidy for a LPG cylinder. The beneficiaries buy LPG cylinders at market rate and subsequently receive subsidy directly in their bank accounts.

With the recent increase in price of a LPG cylinder, the government has increased the subsidy amount for PAHAL consumers from Rs. 153.86 per cylinder to Rs. 291.48 per cylinder (89% increase).³ This is done to ensure that the subsidized LPG consumers are insulated from the volatility of LPG prices in the international market. Table 1 shows the amount of subsidy provided by the government for LPG cylinder. Note that price of a subsidised cylinder has increased from Rs 494 to Rs 567 (14.8%) from February 2019 to February 2020.

Table 1: Difference between the price of subsidised and non-subsidised LPG cylinder

As on	Non-subsidised cylinder	Subsidised cylinder	Subsidy
February 2018	Rs 736.00	Rs 495.63	Rs 240.37
February 2019	Rs 659.00	Rs 493.53	Rs 165.47
February 2020	Rs 858.50	Rs 567.02	Rs 291.48

Sources: Unstarred Question No.1211, February 13, 2019, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Rajya Sabha.
Note: Prices are at Delhi.

How many people avail the subsidy on LPG cylinders?

Currently, there are a total of 27.16 crore LPG (domestic) connections in the country.³ Of these, 26.12 crore (94%) consumers are beneficiaries under the PAHAL scheme, and therefore, can avail LPG cylinders at subsidised rates. Note that, under the scheme, a maximum of 12 subsidised cylinders per year can be availed under one connection. Further, a household cannot have more than one connection.

What is the cost of subsidy for the government?

The subsidy on domestic LPG is met through the budgetary grants of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. In 2020-21, the government is estimated to spend Rs 37,256 crore on LPG subsidy. This includes Rs 35,605 crore for DBT-PAHAL and Rs 1,118 crore for Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana. This is an increase of 9.3% from the expenditure in 2019-20 of Rs 34,086 crore (revised estimate). Note that LPG subsidy constitutes 87% of the Ministry's total budget (Rs 42,901 crore).

Figure 2 below shows the year-wise expenditure on LPG subsidy, and as a proportion of the total budget of the Ministry from 2015-16 to 2020-21.

Figure 2: LPG subsidy over the years (2015-16 to 2020-21).

Sources: Union Budget Documents; PRS.

For more trends and analysis related to the finances of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, see here.

[1] "LPG price hiked by Rs 144.5 per cylinder", Economic Times, February 12, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/lpg-price-hiked-by-rs-144-5-per-cylinder/articleshow/74096745.cms.

[2] Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, https://www.ppac.gov.in/content/137_3_Faq.aspx.

[3] "LPG Price is Derived based on International Market Price", Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, February 13, 2020.

[4] PAHAL-Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG (DBTL) Consumers Scheme, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, http://petroleum.nic.in/dbt/whatisdbtl.html.

Union Budget 2020-21: Are the fiscal targets realistic?

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Gayatri Mann and Suyash Tiwari - February 6, 2020 Comments

Today, a general discussion on the Union Budget 2020-21 is being held in both Houses of Parliament. In the budget, the government presented the estimates of the money it expects to spend on various ministries, and how much money will be raised from different sources such as levy of taxes and dividends from public enterprises in 2020-21. In addition, the budget presented the revised estimates made by the government for the year 2019-20 in comparison to the estimates it had given to Parliament in the previous year’s budget. The budget also gave an account of how much money the government actually raised and spent in 2018-19.

What are revised estimates?

Some of the estimates made by the government might change during the course of the year. For instance, once the year gets underway, some ministries may need more funds than what was actually allocated to them in the budget, or the receipts expected from certain sources might change. Such deviations from the budget estimates get reflected in the figures released by the government at later stages as part of the subsequent budgets. Once the year ends, the actual numbers are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), post which they are presented to Parliament with the upcoming budget, i.e. two years after the estimates are made.

For instance, estimates for the year 2019-20 were presented as part of the 2019-20 budget in July 2019. In the 2020-21 budget (February 2020), the government presented 2019-20’s revised estimates based on the actual receipts and expenditure accounted so far during the year and estimations made for the remaining 2-3 months.

Is there a way to find out the government’s actual receipts or expenditure mid-year?

The actual receipts and expenditure accounts of the central government are maintained by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA), Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. On January 31, 2020, the CGA updated the accounts figures for the period April to December 2019. Thus, we have unaudited actuals for the first nine months of the financial year.

How do the actual figures for the year 2019-20 so far compare with the revised estimates?

Table 1 gives the revised estimates presented by the central government for the year 2019-20 and the monthly account figures maintained by the CGA for the nine-month period April to December 2019. The difference between these two figures gives us the three-month target that the government will have to meet by March 2020 to reach its revised estimates.

Till December 2019, the government has spent Rs 21.1 lakh crore, which is 78% of the revised estimates for 2019-20. While the expenditure has reached 78% of the target, so far, the government has been able to generate only Rs 11.8 lakh crore or 61% of the receipts (excluding borrowings) for the year 2019-20. This implies that the receipts will have to grow at a rate of 41% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the revised estimates of Rs 19.3 lakh crore. So far, receipts have grown at a rate of 4%.

Table 1: Budget at a Glance – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Budget at a Glance	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Budget at a Glance	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Revenue Expenditure	20,07,399	23,49,645	18,54,125	4,95,520	14%	28%
Capital Expenditure	3,07,714	3,48,907	2,55,522	93,385	21%	-3%
Total Expenditure	23,15,113	26,98,552	21,09,647	5,88,905	15%	22%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%
Capital Receipts	1,12,779	81,605	31,025	50,580	-33%	-24%
of which Disinvestment	94,727	65,000	18,100	46,900	-47%	-22%
Total Receipts (without borrowings)	16,65,695	19,31,706	11,77,922	7,53,784	4%	41%
Revenue Deficit	4,54,483	4,99,544	7,07,228	-2,07,684
Fiscal Deficit	6,49,418	7,66,846	9,31,725	-1,64,879
Primary Deficit	66,770	1,41,741	5,07,411	-3,65,670

Sources: Union Budget 2020-21; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

How do the actual tax receipts fare in comparison to the revised estimates of 2019-20?

A lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP has also affected the tax receipts of the government during the year. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20. The revised estimates for 2019-20 show gross tax receipts of Rs 21.6 lakh crore (includes states’ share). Till December 2019, tax receipts of Rs 13.8 lakh crore has been collected, which is 64% of the target. The tax receipts will have to grow at 19% in the three-month period January-March 2020 to meet the target. Table 2 shows similar comparison for the various taxes and also for the tax receipts devolved to states. While the budget estimated a growth in receipts from all major taxes, receipts from taxes such as corporation tax (-14%), union excise duties (-2%), and customs (-12%) have declined during the period Apr-Dec 2019.

Table 2: Tax receipts – Comparison of 2019-20 revised estimates with Apr-Dec 2019 figures (Rs crore)

Revenue Receipts	Actuals	Revised	Nine-month period	Three-month target	Growth rate so far	Growth target
Revenue Receipts	2018-19	2019-20	Apr-Dec 2019	Jan-Mar 2020	% change (Apr-Dec 2018 to Apr-Dec 2019)	% change (Jan-Mar 2019 to Jan-Mar 2020)
Gross Tax Revenue	20,80,465	21,63,423	13,83,035	7,80,388	-3%	19%
Devolution to States	7,61,454	6,56,046	4,76,113	1,79,933	-2%	-34%
Net Tax Revenue	13,17,211	15,04,587	9,04,944	5,99,643	-3%	57%
Dividend and Profits	1,13,420	1,99,893	1,61,979	37,914	175%	-30%
Other Non-tax Revenue	1,22,284	1,45,620	79,974	65,646	-10%	96%
Revenue Receipts	15,52,916	18,50,101	11,46,897	7,03,204	6%	50%

Note: Figures for income tax exclude receipts from the Securities Transaction Tax.

Sources: Receipts Budget, Union Budget 2019-20; Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance; PRS.

If we look at sources of receipts other than taxes, non-tax revenue during Apr-Dec 2019 is Rs 2.4 lakh crore, i.e. 69% of the estimated Rs 3.5 lakh crore. Disinvestment receipts till date amounted to Rs 18,100 crore, i.e. 17% of the budget target of Rs 1.05 lakh crore. Though the investment target has been revised down to Rs 65,000 crore, it implies that Rs 47,000 crore would need to be raised in the next two months.

How does this impact the borrowings of the government?

When the expenditure planned by the government is more than its receipts, the government finances this gap through borrowings. This gap is known as fiscal deficit and equals the borrowings required to be made for that year. Given lower than expected receipts, the government has had to borrow more money than it had planned for. Borrowings or fiscal deficit of the government, till December 2019, stands at Rs 9.3 lakh crore, which is 22% higher than the revised estimate of Rs 7.7 lakh crore. Note that with three months still remaining in the financial year, fiscal deficit may further increase, in case receipts are less than expenditure.

When we look at fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, the 2019-20 budget estimated the fiscal deficit to be at 3.3% of GDP. This has been revised upward to 3.8% of GDP. However, till December 2019, fiscal deficit for the year 2019-20 stands at 4.6% of GDP (taking the latest available GDP figures into account, i.e. the First Advance Estimates for 2019-20 released in January 2020). This increase in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is because of two reasons: (i) an increase in borrowings as compared to the budget estimates, and (ii) a decrease in GDP as compared to the estimate made in the budget. The latter is due to a lower than estimated growth in nominal GDP for the year 2019-20. The 2019-20 budget estimated the nominal GDP to grow at 12% over the previous year, whereas the latest estimates suggest this growth rate to be 7.5% in 2019-20.

Note that, in addition to the expenditure shown in the budget, the government also spends through extra budgetary resources. These resources are raised by issuing bonds and through loans from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF). The revised estimates for 2019-20 show an expenditure of Rs 1,72,699 crore through such extra-budgetary resources. This includes an expenditure of Rs 1,10,000 crore by the Food Corporation of India financed through loans from NSSF. Since funds borrowed for such expenditure remain outside the budget, they do not get factored in the deficit and debt figures. If borrowings made in the form of extra-budgetary resources are also taken into account, the fiscal deficit estimated for the year 2019-20 would increase from 3.8% of GDP to 4.6% of GDP due to extra-budgetary borrowings of Rs 1,72,699 crore. This does not account for further slippage if the targeted revenue does not materialise.

The Anti-Defection Law Explained

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