Control over Budget: Effectiveness of Parliament
During the recess, the Departmentally Related Standing Committees of Parliament examine the Demand for Grants submitted by various Ministries. The Demand for Grants are detailed explanations of that Ministry's annual budget which form part of the total budget of the government. These are examined in detail, and the committees can approve of the demands, or suggest changes. The Demand for Grants are finally discussed and voted on by the Parliament after the recess. (The post below lists the ministries whose Demand for Grants will be discussed in detail after the recess). The issue is - how effective is the institution of Parliament in examining the budget? Though India specific information on this subject is hard to find, K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky have cited the World Bank - OECD Budget procedures Database to formulate a table on the legislature approving the budget presented by the executive ("The Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process: A Comparative Review", Legislative Oversight and Budgeting). I reproduce the table below:
|In Practice, does the legislature generally approve the budget as presented by the Executive? (in percent)|
|Answer||All Countries||OECD Countries||Presidential democracies||Parliamentary democracies|
|It generally approves the budget with no changes||34||33||14||41|
|Minor changes are made (affecting less than 3% of total spending)||63||67||71||59|
|Major changes are made (affecting more than 3% but less than 20% of total spending)||2||0||7||0|
|The budget approved is significantly different (affecting more than 20% of total spending)||0||0||0||0|
|Sources: K. Barraclough and B. Dorotinsky; PRS.|
The Union Cabinet approved the Model Tenancy Act, 2021 on June 2, 2021, for adoption by state and union territory governments. The Model Act has three primary objectives. First, it aims to regulate renting of residential and commercial premises by establishing conditions for tenancy, eviction, and management of the property. Second, in regulating tenancy, it proposes mechanisms to balance and protect the rights of landlords and tenants. Last, it proposes a three-tier adjudicatory mechanism consisting of Rent Authorities, Rent Courts, and Rent Tribunals for speedy adjudication of tenancy related disputes.
However, note that rental housing is regulated by states as land, land improvement, and control of rents falls under the State List of the Indian Constitution. This Model Act is only a proposed framework that states and union territories may alter when passing their own tenancy laws.
In this blog, we provide a background on the rental housing market and explain some issues with the 2021 Model Act.
Need for the Act
In India, 95% of households in rural areas live in self-owned housing, and rental housing is a predominantly urban phenomenon. Between 1951 and 2011, the urban population in India grew by six times and as of 2011, comprises 31% of the total population. This is projected to grow to 40% by 2036. However, the share of persons living in urban rental accommodation has decreased from 58% to 27% between 1961 and 2011. The 2015 draft National Urban Rental Housing Policy noted that urban areas face a significant housing shortage and stated that this cannot be addressed by home ownership. In 2012, a Technical Group studying urban housing shortage estimated the urban housing shortage to be at 1.9 crore units. The 2011 Census noted that between 6.5 crore to 10 crore people (17% to 24% of the urban population) live in unauthorised housing in urban areas. The Economic Survey (2017-18) noted that rental housing is a key way to address informality and shortage. It stated that rental housing enables mobility and affordability for low-income segments, who may not be able to purchase housing. It also observed that a significant portion of urban rental housing stock is vacant, attributing it to unclear property laws, poor contract enforcement, and rent control laws.
State governments regulate rental housing through various legislative tools including rent control laws. To prevent landlords from charging exorbitant rent and ensure affordable housing, these laws specify a ceiling on rent and put conditions on eviction of tenants. The 2015 draft Policy noted that rent control laws discourage private investment in rental properties. It observed that rent control laws also skew arrangements towards tenants and lead to more litigation. This has eroded the trust of landlords in the regulatory system. A significant share of the rental demand is addressed through alternate arrangements such as leave and license agreements and informal leases.
A model law to regulate tenancy was first proposed in 1992. The first draft Model Tenancy Act was released in 2015, which was adopted by Tamil Nadu. However, as of 2021, 20 states including Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal continue to have rent control laws. A few states including Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh have repealed their rent control laws.
Besides its key objectives, the Model Act also seeks to ensure affordability, formalisation and increase private investment in the rental housing market. The framework proposed under the Model Act may address some of these concerns. However, experts have recommended supplementing this with other policy initiatives to meet these objectives. For instance, a 2012 Technical Group observed that about 96% of the urban housing shortage pertains to the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) and Lower Income Group (LIG) categories. The 2015 draft Urban Rental Housing Policy noted that a repeal of rent control laws may increase private investment and availability of rental housing. However, it has recommended several other measures to ensure affordability of rental housing. These include: (i) provision of incentives such as tax exemptions and subsidies to tenants and home owners, (ii) encouraging public-private partnerships and residential rental management companies, and (iii) enhancing access to finance within the EWS and LIG sectors.
Concerns for right to privacy
The Model Act requires all landlord and tenants to intimate the Rent Authority about a rental agreement with a prescribed form. The form requires both the tenant and the landlord to submit their Aadhaar numbers and attach self-attested copies of the card with the form. This may violate a 2018 Supreme Court judgement, which states that requiring Aadhaar card or number can be made mandatory only for expenditure on a subsidy, benefit or service incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India. Registering a tenancy agreement does not entail these, therefore making Aadhaar number mandatory for registering a tenancy may violate the judgement.
The Model Act also states that tenants and landlords will be provided with a unique identification number after registering a rental agreement. Details of the agreement along with other documents will be uploaded on the Rent Authority’s website. It is unclear if personal details of the parties such as PAN and Aadhaar number, which must be submitted along with the agreement, will also be made available publicly. If these are shared on the website, this may violate the right to privacy of the involved parties. The Supreme Court has included the right to privacy as a fundamental right. This right may be infringed only if three conditions are met: (i) there is a law, (ii) the law achieves a public purpose, and (iii) the public purpose is proportionate to the violation of privacy. Sharing personal information of individuals may not serve a public purpose, and hence may violate the right to privacy of such individuals.
The preamble of the 2021 Model Act and the background note accompanying the 2020 draft Model Act state that it seeks to establish a speedy adjudication mechanism for disputes linked to tenancy agreements. The Model Act specifies the timelines for resolution of cases linked with eviction and payment of rent. However, timelines have not been specified for certain cases. For instance, no timeline has been specified within which the Rent Authority must resolve a dispute on withholding of essential services or revision of rent.
Specification of minute details
The Model Act seeks to balance the tenant-landlord relationship by specifying rights and duties of both parties. However, it also caps the maximum possible security deposit amount that a tenant must pay to the landlord. Further, a suggestive framework for the rental agreement also includes minute details on responsibility for repair and maintenance. If codified, these specifications may hinder flexibility in framing tenancy agreements.
For a PRS analysis of the Model Tenancy Act 2021, please see here.
Recently, the Karnataka legislature passed the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) Bill, 2020. BBMP is the municipal corporation of the Greater Bengaluru metropolitan area. The BBMP Act, 2020 seeks to improve decentralisation, ensure public participation, and address certain administrative and structural concerns in Bengaluru. In this blog, we discuss some common issues in urban local governance in India, in the context of Bengaluru’s municipal administration.
The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 provided for the establishment of urban local bodies (ULBs) (including municipal corporations) as institutions of local self-government. It also empowered state governments to devolve certain functions, authority, and power to collect revenue to these bodies, and made periodic elections for them compulsory.
Urban governance is part of the state list under the Constitution. Thus, the administrative framework and regulation of ULBs varies across states. However, experts have highlighted that ULBs across India face similar challenges. For instance, ULBs across the country lack autonomy in city management and several city-level functions are managed by parastatals (managed by and accountable to the state). Several taxation powers have also not been devolved to these bodies, leading to stressed municipal finances. These challenges have led to poor service delivery in cities and also created administrative and governance challenges at the municipal level.
BBMP was established under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (KMC Act). The BBMP Act, 2020 replaces provisions of the KMC Act, 1976 in its application to Bengaluru. It adds a new level of zonal committees to the existing three-tier municipal structure in the city, and also gives the Corporation some more taxation powers. Certain common issues in urban local governance in India, with provisions related to them in the BBMP Act, 2020 are given below.
Functional overlap with parastatals for key functions
The Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 empowered states to devolve the responsibility of 18 functions including urban planning, regulation of land use, water supply, and slum upgradation to ULBs. However, in most Indian cities including Bengaluru, a majority of these functions are carried out by parastatals. For example, in Bengaluru, the Bengaluru Development Authority is responsible for land regulation and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board is responsible for slum rehabilitation.
The BBMP Act, 2020 provides the Corporation with the power and responsibility to prepare and implement schemes for the 18 functions provided for in the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992. However, it does not provide clarity if new bodies at the municipal level will be created, or the existing parastatals will continue to perform these functions and if so, whether their accountability will shift from the state to the municipal corporation.
This could create a two-fold challenge in administration. First, if there are multiple agencies performing similar functions, it could lead to a functional overlap, ambiguity, and wastage of resources. Second, and more importantly, the presence of parastatals that are managed by and accountable to the state government leads to an erosion of the ULB’s autonomy. Several experts have highlighted that this lack of autonomy faced by municipal corporations in most Indian cities leads to a challenge in governance, effective service delivery, and development of urban areas.
An Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) had recommended that activity mapping should be done for the 18 functions. Under this, functions in the exclusive domain of municipalities and those which need to be shared with the state and the central government must be specified. Experts have also recommended that the municipality should be responsible for providing civic amenities in its jurisdiction and if a parastatal exercises a civic function, it should be accountable to the municipality.
Stressed municipal finances
Indian ULBs are amongst the weakest in the world in terms of fiscal autonomy and have limited effective devolution of revenue. They also have limited capacity to raise resources through their own sources of revenue such as property tax. Municipal revenue in India accounts for only one percent of the GDP (2017-18). This leads to a dependence on transfers by the state and central government.
ULBs in states like Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Haryana are in poor financial condition. This has been attributed to limited powers to raise revenue and levy taxes, and problems in the management of existing resources. For instance, the finances of Bihar’s ULBs were assessed to be poor because of: (i) delays in release of grants, (ii) inadequate devolution of funds, and (iii) delays in revision of tax rates and assessments of landholdings.
In comparison, Karnataka ranks high among Indian states in key indicators for fiscal capacity like collection of property taxes, grants from Central Finance Commissions, and state government transfers. The BBMP Act, 2020 further increases the taxation powers of the Corporation, by allowing it to impose taxes on professions and entertainment.
Experts have recommended that the central government and the respective state government should provide additional funds and facilitate additional funding mechanisms for ULBs to strengthen their finances. The revenue of ULBs can be augmented through measures including assignment of greater powers of taxation to the ULBs by the state government, reforms in land and property-based taxes (such as the use of technology to cover more properties), and issuing of municipal bonds (debt instruments issued by ULBs to finance development projects).
Powers of elected municipal officials
The executive power with state-appointed municipal Commissioners and elected municipal officers differs across states. States like Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, and cities like Chennai and Hyderabad vest the executive power in the Commissioner. In contrast, the executive power of the Corporation is exercised by a Mayor-in council (consisting of the Mayor and up to 10 elected members of the Corporation) in Kolkata and Madhya Pradesh. This is unlike large metropolitan cities in other countries like New York and London, where elected Mayors are designated as executive heads. Experts have noted that charging Commissioners with executive power diluted the role of the Mayor and violated the spirit of self-governance.
Under the BBMP Act, 2020, both the elected Mayor and the state-appointed Chief Commissioner exercise several executive functions. The Mayor is responsible for approving contracts and preparing the budget estimate for the Corporation. He is also required to discharge all functions assigned to him by the Corporation. On the other hand, executive functions of the Chief Commissioner include: (i) selling or leasing properties owned by the Corporation, and (ii) regulating and issuing instructions regarding public streets.
The Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure (2011) has recommended that the Commissioner should act as a city manager and should be recruited through a transparent search-cum-selection process led by the Mayor. A Model Municipal law, released by the Urban Development Ministry in 2003, provided that the executive power should be exercised by an Empowered Standing Committee consisting of the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, and seven elected councillors.
Management of staff and human resources
Experts have noted that municipal administration in India suffers from staffing issues which leads to a failure in delivering basic urban services. These include overstaffing of untrained manpower, shortage of qualified technical staff and managerial supervisors, and unwillingness to innovate in methods for service delivery.
The BBMP Act, 2020 provides that the Corporation may make bye-laws for the due performance of duties by its employees. However, it does not mention other aspects of human resource management such as recruitment and promotion. A CAG report (2020) looking at the implementation of the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 in Karnataka has observed that the power to assess municipal staff requirements, recruiting such staff, and determining their pay, transfer and promotion vests with the state government. This is in contrast with the recommendations of several experts who have suggested that municipalities should appoint their personnel to ensure accountability, adequate recruitment, and proper management of staff.
Other states including Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu also allow the state governments to regulate recruitment and staffing for ULBs. In cities like Mumbai, and Coimbatore, and some states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, while the recruitment process is conducted by the respective municipal corporations, the final sanction for hiring staff lies with the state government.