On Monday, December 4, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha disqualified two Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (better known as the anti-defection law) for having defected from their party.[1] These members were elected on a Janata Dal (United) ticket. The Madras High Court is also hearing petitions filed by 18 MLAs who were disqualified by the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly in September 2017 under the anti-defection law. Allegations of legislators defecting in violation of the law have been made in several other states including Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Nagaland, Telangana and Uttarakhand in recent years.[2] In this context, we explain the anti-defection law.
What is the anti-defection law?
Aaya Ram Gaya Ram was a phrase that became popular in Indian politics after a Haryana MLA Gaya Lal changed his party thrice within the same day in 1967. The anti-defection law sought to prevent such political defections which may be due to reward of office or other similar considerations.[3]
The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution in 1985. It lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on grounds of defection by the Presiding Officer of a legislature based on a petition by any other member of the House. A legislator is deemed to have defected if he either voluntarily gives up the membership of his party or disobeys the directives of the party leadership on a vote. This implies that a legislator defying (abstaining or voting against) the party whip on any issue can lose his membership of the House. The law applies to both Parliament and state assemblies.
Are there any exceptions under the law?
Yes, legislators may change their party without the risk of disqualification in certain circumstances. The law allows a party to merge with or into another party provided that at least two-thirds of its legislators are in favour of the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who decide to merge, nor the ones who stay with the original party will face disqualification.
Various expert committees have recommended that rather than the Presiding Officer, the decision to disqualify a member should be made by the President (in case of MPs) or the Governor (in case of MLAs) on the advice of the Election Commission.[4] This would be similar to the process followed for disqualification in case the person holds an office of profit (i.e. the person holds an office under the central or state government which carries a remuneration, and has not been excluded in a list made by the legislature).
How has the law been interpreted by the Courts while deciding on related matters?
The Supreme Court has interpreted different provisions of the law. We discuss some of these below.
The phrase ‘Voluntarily gives up his membership’ has a wider connotation than resignation
The law provides for a member to be disqualified if he ‘voluntarily gives up his membership’. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted that in the absence of a formal resignation by the member, the giving up of membership can be inferred by his conduct.[5] In other judgments, members who have publicly expressed opposition to their party or support for another party were deemed to have resigned.[6]
In the case of the two JD(U) MPs who were disqualified from Rajya Sabha on Monday, they were deemed to have ‘voluntarily given up their membership’ by engaging in anti-party activities which included criticizing the party on public forums on multiple occasions, and attending rallies organised by opposition parties in Bihar.[7]
Decision of the Presiding Officer is subject to judicial review
The law initially stated that the decision of the Presiding Officer is not subject to judicial review. This condition was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1992, thereby allowing appeals against the Presiding Officer’s decision in the High Court and Supreme Court.[8] However, it held that there may not be any judicial intervention until the Presiding Officer gives his order.
In 2015, the Hyderabad High Court, refused to intervene after hearing a petition which alleged that there had been delay by the Telangana Assembly Speaker in acting against a member under the anti-defection law.[9]
Is there a time limit within which the Presiding Officer has to decide?
The law does not specify a time-period for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification plea. Given that courts can intervene only after the Presiding Officer has decided on the matter, the petitioner seeking disqualification has no option but to wait for this decision to be made.
There have been several cases where the Courts have expressed concern about the unnecessary delay in deciding such petitions.[10] In some cases this delay in decision making has resulted in members, who have defected from their parties, continuing to be members of the House. There have also been instances where opposition members have been appointed ministers in the government while still retaining the membership of their original parties in the legislature.[11]
In recent years, opposition MLAs in some states, such as Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, have broken away in small groups gradually to join the ruling party. In some of these cases, more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party.
In these scenarios, the MLAs were subject to disqualification while defecting to the ruling party in smaller groups. However, it is not clear if they will still face disqualification if the Presiding Officer makes a decision after more than 2/3rd of the opposition has defected to the ruling party. The Telangana Speaker in March 2016 allowed the merger of the TDP Legislature Party in Telangana with the ruling TRS, citing that in total, 80% of the TDP MLAs (12 out of 15) had joined the TRS at the time of taking the decision.[12]
In Andhra Pradesh, legislators of the main opposition party recently boycotted the entire 12-day assembly session. This boycott was in protest against the delay of over 18 months in action being taken against legislators of their party who have allegedly defected to the ruling party.[13] The Vice President, in his recent order disqualifying two JD(U) members stated that all such petitions should be decided by the Presiding Officers within a period of around three months.
Does the anti-defection law affect the ability of legislators to make decisions?
The anti-defection law seeks to provide a stable government by ensuring the legislators do not switch sides. However, this law also restricts a legislator from voting in line with his conscience, judgement and interests of his electorate. Such a situation impedes the oversight function of the legislature over the government, by ensuring that members vote based on the decisions taken by the party leadership, and not what their constituents would like them to vote for.
Political parties issue a direction to MPs on how to vote on most issues, irrespective of the nature of the issue. Several experts have suggested that the law should be valid only for those votes that determine the stability of the government (passage of the annual budget or no-confidence motions).[14]
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[1] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066 and http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57067.
[2] MLA Defection Politics Not New, Firstpost, March 13, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-forms-govt-in-goa-manipur-mla-defection-politics-not-new-telangana-ap-perfected-it-3331872.html.
[3] The Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend52.htm.
[4] Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdfand the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm.
[5] Ravi Naik vs Union of India, 1994, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/554446/.
[6] G.Viswanathan Vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras& Another, 1996, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1093980/ and Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, 2007, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1620629/ and Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[7] Parliamentary Bulletin-II, December 4, 2017, http://164.100.47.5/newsite/bulletin2/Bull_No.aspx?number=57066.
[8] Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachilhu and Others, 1992, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1686885/.
[9] Sabotage of Anti-Defection Law in Telangana, 2015, https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/50/commentary/sabotage-anti-defection-law-telangana.html.
[10] Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs Kuldeep Bishnoi & Ors., 2012, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45034065/ and Mayawati Vs Markandeya Chand & Ors., 1998, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1801522/.
[11] Anti-Defecton Law Ignored, November 30, 2017, http://www.news18.com/news/politics/anti-defection-law-ignored-as-mlas-defect-to-tdp-trs-in-andhra-pradesh-and-telangana-1591319.htmland It’s official Minister Talasani is still a TDP Member, March 27, 2015, http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Telangana/2015-03-27/Its-Official-Minister-Talasani-is-still-a-TDP-member/140135.
[12] Telangana Legislative Assembly Bulletin, March 10, 2016, http://www.telanganalegislature.org.in/documents/10656/19317/Assembly+Buletin.PDF/a0d4bb52-9acf-494f-80e7-3a16e3480460; 12 TDP MLAs merged with TRS, March 11, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/12-tdp-mlas-merged-with-trs/article8341018.ece.
[13] The line TD leaders dare not cross, December 4, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/the-line-td-leaders-dare-not-cross/article21257521.ece
[14] Report of the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution, 2002, http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/ncrwcreport.htm, Report of the Committee on electoral reforms, 1990, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Dinesh%20Goswami%20Report%20on%20Electoral%20Reforms.pdf and Law Commission (170th report), 1999, http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/lc170.htm.
Early this week, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India tabled a report on the finances of Uttar Pradesh for the financial year 2020-21. A few days prior to that, on May 26, the budget for Uttar Pradesh for 2022-23 was presented, along with which the final audited expenditure and receipt figures for the year 2020-21 were released. The year 2020-21 presented a two-fold challenge for states – loss in revenue due to impact of COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, and the need for increased expenditure to support affected persons and economic recovery. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh’s GSDP grew by 1.05% in 2020-21 as compared to a growth of 6.5% in 2019-20. The state reported a revenue deficit of Rs 2,367 crore in 2020-21 after reporting revenue surplus for 14 successive years since 2006-07. Revenue deficit is the excess of revenue expenditure over revenue receipts. This blog looks at the key trends in the finances of Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 and certain observations by CAG on fiscal management by the state.
Spending and Deficits in 2020-21
Underspending: In 2020-21, total spending by the state was 26% less than the budget estimate presented in February 2020. In sectors such as water supply and sanitation, the actual expenditure was 60% less than the amount budgeted, while in agriculture and allied activities only 53% of the budgeted amount was spent. CAG observed that in 251 schemes across 57 departments, the state government did not incur any expenditure in 2020-21. These schemes had a budget provision of at least one crore rupees, and had cumulative allocation of Rs 50,617 crore. These included schemes such as Pipe Drinking Water Scheme in Bundelkhand/Vindhya and apportionment of pension liabilities. Moreover, the overall savings due to non-utilisation of funds in 2020-21 was 27.28% of total budget provisions. CAG observed that the budgetary provisions increased between 2016 and 2021. However, the utilisation of budget provisions reduced between 2018-19 and 2020-21.
Pattern of spending: CAG observed that in case of 12 departments, more than 50% of the expenditure was incurred in March 2021, the last month of the financial year. In the civil aviation department, 89% of the total expenditure was incurred in March while this figure was 62% for the social welfare department (welfare of handicapped and backward classes). CAG noted that maintaining a steady pace of expenditure is a sound practice under public financial management. However, the Uttar Pradesh Budget Manual has no specific instructions for preventing such bunching of expenditure. The CAG recommended that the state government can consider issuing guidelines to control the rush of expenditure towards the closing months of the financial year.
Management of deficit and debt: As a measure to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, an Ordinance was promulgated in June 2020 to raise the fiscal deficit limit from 3% of GSDP to 5% of GSDP for the year 2020-21. Fiscal deficit represents the gap between expenditure and receipts in a year, and this gap is filled with borrowings. The Uttar Pradesh Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2004 (FRBM Act) passed by Uttar Pradesh Assembly specifies the upper limit for debt and deficits. The Ordinance thus permitted the state government to borrow more to sustain its budget expenditure. The fiscal deficit of the state in 2020-21 was 3.20% of GSDP, well below the revised limit. At the same time, the state’s outstanding debt to GSDP in 2020-21 was 32.77% of GSDP, above the target of 32% of GSDP set under the FRBM Act. Outstanding debt represents accumulation of debt over the years.
Table 1: Spending by Uttar Pradesh in 2020-21 as compared to Budget Estimates (in Rs crore)
|
Particular |
2020-21 BE |
2020-21 Actuals |
% change from BE to Actuals |
|
Net Receipts (1+2) |
4,24,767 |
2,97,311 |
-30% |
|
1. Revenue Receipts (a+b+c+d) |
4,22,567 |
2,96,176 |
-30% |
|
a. Own Tax Revenue |
1,58,413 |
1,19,897 |
-24% |
|
b. Own Non-Tax Revenue |
31,179 |
11,846 |
-62% |
|
c. Share in central taxes |
1,52,863 |
1,06,687 |
-30% |
|
d. Grants-in-aid from the Centre |
80,112 |
57,746 |
-28% |
|
Of which GST compensation grants |
7,608 |
9,381 |
23% |
|
2. Non-Debt Capital Receipts |
2,200 |
1,135 |
-48% |
|
3. Borrowings |
75,791 |
86,859 |
15% |
|
Of which GST compensation loan |
- |
6,007 |
- |
|
Net Expenditure (4+5+6) |
4,77,963 |
3,51,933 |
-26% |
|
4. Revenue Expenditure |
3,95,117 |
2,98,543 |
-24% |
|
5. Capital Outlay |
81,209 |
52,237 |
-36% |
|
6. Loans and Advances |
1,637 |
1,153 |
-30% |
|
7. Debt Repayment |
34,897 |
26,777 |
-23% |
|
Revenue Balance |
27,451 |
-2,367 |
-109% |
|
Revenue Balance (as % of GSDP) |
1.53% |
-0.14% |
|
|
Fiscal Deficit |
53,195 |
54,622 |
3% |
|
Fiscal Deficit (as % of GSDP) |
2.97% |
3.20% |
Note: A negative revenue balance indicates a deficit. The actual fiscal deficit reported by Uttar Pradesh for 2020-21 in 2022-23 budget was 2.8% of GSDP. This difference was due to higher GSDP figure reported by the state.
Sources: Uttar Pradesh Budget Documents of various years; CAG; PRS.
Finances of State Public Sector Undertakings
Public sector undertakings (PSUs) are set up by the government to discharge commercial activities in various sectors. As on March 31, 2021, there were 115 PSUs in Uttar Pradesh. CAG analysed the performance of 38 PSUs. Out of these 38 PSUs, 22 companies earned a profit of Rs 700 crore, while 16 companies posted a loss of Rs 7,411 crore in 2020-21. Note that both the number of PSUs incurring losses and the quantum of losses has decreased since 2018-19. In 2018-19, 20 PSUs had reported losses worth Rs 15,219 crore.
Figure 1: Cumulative losses incurred by Uttar Pradesh PSUs (Rs crore)
Sources: CAG; PRS.
Losses of power sector PSUs: Three power sector PSUs—Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, and Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited—were the top loss incurring PSUs. These three PSUs accounted for 73% of the total losses of Rs 7,411 crore mentioned above. Note that as of June 2022, for each unit of power supplied, the revenue realised by UP power distribution companies (discoms) is 27 paise less than cost of supply. This is better than the gap of 34 paise per unit at the national level. However, the aggregate technical and commercial losses (AT&C) of the Uttar Pradesh discoms was 27.85%, considerably higher than the national average of 17.19%. AT&C losses refer to the proportion of power supplied by a discom for which it does not receive any payment.
Off-budget borrowings: CAG also observed that the Uttar Pradesh government resorted to off-budget borrowing through state owned PSUs/authorities. Off budget borrowings are not accounted in the debt of the state government and are on books of the respective PSUs/authorities, although, debt is serviced by the state government. As a result, the outstanding debt reported in the budget does not represent the actual debt position of the state. CAG identified off-budget borrowing worth Rs 1,637 crore. The CAG recommended that the state government should avoid extra-budget borrowings. It should also credit all the loans taken by PSUs/authorities on behalf of and serviced by the state government to state government accounts.
Management of Reserve Funds
The Reserve Bank of India manages two reserve funds on the behalf of state governments. These funds are created to meet the liabilities of state governments. These funds are: (i) Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF), and (ii) Guarantee Redemption Fund (GRF). They are funded by the contributions made by the state governments. CSF is an amortisation fund which is utilised to meet the repayment obligations of the government. Amortisation refers to payment of debt through regular instalments. The interest accumulated in the fund is used for repayment of outstanding liabilities (which is the accumulation of total borrowings at the end of a financial year, including any liabilities on the public account).
In line with the recommendation of the 12th Finance Commission, Uttar Pradesh created its CSF in March 2020. The state government may transfer at least 0.5% of its outstanding liabilities at the end of the previous year to the CSF. CAG observed that in 2020-21, Uttar Pradesh appropriated only Rs 1,000 crore to the CSF against the requirement of Rs 2,454 crore. CAG recommended that the state government should ensure at least 0.5% of the outstanding liabilities are contributed towards the CSF every year.
GRF is constituted by states to meet obligations related to guarantees. The state government may extend guarantee on loans taken by its PSUs. Guarantees are contingent liabilities of the state government, as in case of default by the company, repayment burden will fall on the state government. GRF can be used to settle guarantees extended by the government with respect to borrowings of state PSUs and other bodies. The 12th Finance Commission had recommended that states should constitute GRF. It was to be funded through guarantees fees to meet any sudden discharge of obligated guarantees extended by the states. CAG noted that Uttar Pradesh government has not constituted GRF. Moreover, the state has also not fixed any limits for extending guarantees.
For an analysis of Uttar Pradesh’s 2022-23 budget, please see here.
