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Posts Tagged ‘parliament’

The Budget: What happens next and some stats on what happened before

March 14th, 2013 3 comments

Authored by Vishnu Padmanabhan and Priya Soman

The Budget speech may have already been scrutinised and the numbers analysed but the Budget process is far from complete.  The Constitution requires expenditure from the government’s Consolidated Fund of India to be approved by the Lok Sabha (the Rajya Sabha does not vote, but can suggest changes). After the Finance Minister presents the Union Budget, Parliament holds a general discussion followed by a detailed discussion and vote on Demands for Grants. In the general discussion, the House discusses the Budget as a whole but no motions can be moved and no voting takes place.  In the 15th Lok Sabha, the average time spent during the Budget Session on general discussion has been 13 hours 20 minutes so far.

Following the general discussion, Parliament breaks for recess while Demands for Grants – the projected expenditure by different ministries – are examined by the relevant Standing Committees of Parliament. This year Parliament is scheduled to break for a month from March 22nd to April 22nd. After the break, the Standing Committees table their reports; the grants are discussed in detail and voted on.  Last year, the total time spent on the Union Budget, on both general and detailed discussion was around 32 hours (or 18% of total time in the session), largely in line with the average time spent over the last 10 years (33 hours, 20% of total time). A unique feature of Indian democracy is the separate presentation and discussion for the Railway Budget.  Including the Railway Budget the overall time spent on budget discussion last year was around 55 hours (30% of total time in the session).

Note: All data from Budget sessions; data from 2004 and 2009 include interim budget sessions. Source: Lok Sabha Resume of Work, PRS

During the detailed discussion, MPs can call for ‘cut motions’ to reduce the amounts of demands for grants made by a Ministry. This motion can be tabled in three ways: (i) ‘the amount of the demand be reduced to Re.1/’ signifying disapproval of the policies of that ministry; (ii)  ‘the amount of the demand be reduced by a specified amount’, an economy cut signifying a disapproval of the amount spent by the ministry  and (iii) ‘the amount of the demand be reduced by Rs.100/-‘, a token cut airing a specific grievance within the policy of the government. However in practice almost all demands for grants are clubbed and voted together (a process called guillotining).

In 2012, 92% of demands for grants were guillotined. The grants for Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Health and Family Welfare, Home Affairs and Urban Development were the only grants taken up for discussion. Over the last 10 years, 85% of demands for grants have been voted for without discussion. The most frequently discussed demand for grants come from the Ministry of Home Affairs (discussed in 6 of the last 10 sessions) and the Ministry of Rural Development (5 times).  Demand for grants for Defence, the largest spending Ministry, has only been voted after discussion once in the last 10 years.

Source: Lok Sabha Resume of Work, Union Budget documents, PRS

If the government needs to spend any additional money, it can introduce Supplementary Demands for Grants during the year.  However if after the financial year government spending on a service exceeds the amount granted, then an Excess Demand for Grant has to be introduced and passed in the following year.  The Budget process concludes with the introduction and passage of the Appropriation Bill authorising the government to spend money from the Consolidated Fund of India. In addition, a Finance Bill, containing the taxation proposals of the government is considered and passed by the Lok Sabha after the Demands for Grants have been voted upon.

Some Important Anti-Corruption Bills in Parliament

November 23rd, 2012 1 comment

Listed below are some key Bills pending in Parliament that are expected to address various aspects of corruption in India. These Bills need to be scrutinized carefully by both lawmakers and citizens alike, so as the strengthen them. Citizen groups can engage in a variety of ways to get their views heard, which have been described in the primer on Engaging with Policy Makers.

Some of these anti-corruption Bills are listed in the current Winter Session for consideration and passing. These are marked in red below. (The full list of all Bills being considered in the Winter Session can be accessed here.)

Each Bill below has been hyperlinked to a page which has the text of the Bill, the report of the Standing Committee, PRS analysis, and other relevant documents, all in one place. Spreading this message to a number of interested people will be a very useful contribution by all those interested in building greater engagement of people with what happens in Parliament.

 

Bill

Date of introduction

Status

Brief description

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 2011 (Listed for passing) December 22, 2011 Passed by Lok Sabha on 27 Dec 2011. Report of Rajya Sabha Select Committee submitted on November 23, 2012. It seeks to establish the office of the Lok Pal at the centre and Lokayuktas in states for inquiring into complaints against certain public servants.The Bill once passed shall be applicable to states if they give their consent to its application.
The Whistle Blowers Protection Bill, 2011 (Listed for passing) August 26, 2010 Passed by Lok Sabha on December 27, 2011. Pending in Rajya Sabha It seeks to protect whistleblowers (person making a disclosure related to acts of corruption, misuse of power or criminal offence).Under the Bill any person including a public servant may make such a disclosure to the Central or State Vigilance Commission.The identity of the complainant shall not be disclosed.
The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Bill, 2011 August 18, 2011 Standing Committee submitted its Report on June 26, 2012 The Bill prohibits all persons from entering into benami transactions (property transactions in the name of another person).Any benami property shall be confiscated by the central government.It seeks to replace the existing Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
The Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of Public International Organisations Bill, 2011 (Listed for passing) March 25, 2011 Standing Committee  submitted its Report on March 29, 2012 Indiais a signatory to the UN Convention against corruption. The Bill is necessary for India to ratify the Convention.The Bill makes it an offence to accept or offer a bribe to foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations in order to obtain or retain international business
The Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011 December 20, 2011 Standing Committee submitted its Report on August 28, 2012 It requires every public authority to publish a citizen charter within six months of commencement of the Act.The charter should detail the goods and services to be provided and the timeline for their delivery.
The Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 December 27, 2011 Standing Committee submitted its Report on August 30, 2012 The Bill requires all public authorities to deliver all public services electronically within a maximum period of eight years.There are two exceptions to this requirement: (a) service which cannot be delivered electronically; and (b) services that the public authorities in consultation with the respective Central and State EDS Commissions decide not to deliver electronically.
The Prevention of Money-Laundering (Amendment) Bill, 2011 (Listed for passing) December 27, 2011 Standing Committee submitted its Report on May 9, 2012 The Bill Amends the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.This Bill widens the definition of offences under money laundering to include activities like concealment, acquisition, possession and use of proceeds of crime.It provides for the provisional attachment and confiscation of property (for a maximum period of 180 days).
The National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 December 3, 2010 Standing Committee  submitted its Report on December 13,  2011 The Bill seeks to establish the National Identification Authority of India to issue unique identification numbers (called ‘Aadhaar’) to residents ofIndia.Every person residing inIndia(regardless of citizenship) is entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number after furnishing the required information.The number shall serve as an identity proof.  But not as a citizenship proof.
The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 December 1, 2010 Passed by Lok Sabha on March 29, 2012; Pending in Rajya Sabha It replaces the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.  It provides for enforceable standards for the conduct of High Court and Supreme Court judges.The Bill requires judges and their spouses and children to declare their assets and liabilities.  It also establishes a process for the removal of judges of Supreme Court and High Court
The Public Procurement Bill, 2012 May 14, 2012 Standing Committee Report pending The Bill seeks to regulate and ensure transparency in the procurement process.  It applies to procurement processes above Rs 50 lakh.The procuring entity shall adhere to certain standards such as (a) ensuring efficiency and economy; and (b) provide fair and equitable treatment to bidders.

Sources: Respective Bills, PRS Legislative Research

 

 

NATGRID: Should Parliament have a role?

June 20th, 2011 1 comment

The Union government’s Cabinet Committee on Security recently gave clearance to the Home Ministry’s NATGRID project.  The project aims to allow investigation and law enforcement agencies to access real-time information from data stored with agencies such as the Income Tax Department, banks, insurance companies, Indian Railways, credit card transactions, and more.  NATGRID, like a number of other government initiatives (UIDAI), is being established through governmental notifications rather than legislation passed in Parliament.  The examination of this issue requires an assessment of the benefits of legislation vis-a-vis government notifications.

Government notifications can be issued either under a specific law, or independent of a parent law, provided that the department issuing such notification has the power to do so.  Rules, regulations which are notified have the advantage of flexibility since they can be changed without seeking Parliamentary approval.

This advantage of initiating projects or establishing institutions through government notifications is also potentially of detriment to the system of checks and balances that a democracy rests on.  For, while legislation takes a longer time to be enacted (it is discussed, modified and debated in Parliament before being put to vote), this also enables elected representatives to oversee various dimensions of such projects.  In the case of NATGRID, the process would provide Parliamentarians the opportunity to debate the conditions under which private individual information can be accessed, what information may be accessed, and for what purpose.  This time consuming process is in fact of valuable import to projects such as NATGRID which have a potential impact on fundamental rights.

Finally, because changing a law is itself a rigorous process, the conditions imposed on the access to personal information attain a degree of finality and cannot be ignored or deviated from.  Government rules and regulations on the other hand, can be changed by the concerned department as and when it deems necessary.  Though even governmental action can be challenged if it infringes fundamental rights, well-defined limits within laws passed by Parliament can help provide a comprehensive set of rules which would prevent their infringement in the first place.

The Parliamentary deliberative process in framing a law is thus even more important than the law itself.  This is especially so in cases of government initiatives affecting justiciable rights.  This deliberative process, or the potential scrutiny of government drafted legislation on the floor of Parliament ensures that limitations on government discretion are clearly laid down, and remedies to unauthorised acts are set in stone.  This also ensures that the authority seeking to implement the project is

The other issue pertains to the legal validity of the project itself.  Presently, certain departmental agencies maintain databases of personal information which helps them provide essential services, or maintain law and order.  The authority to maintain such databases flows from the laws which define their functions and obligations.  So the power of maintaining legal databases is implicit because of the nature of functions these agencies perform.  However, there is no implicit or explicit authorization to the convergence of these independent databases.

One may argue that the government is not legally prevented from interlinking databases.  However, the absence of a legal challenge to the creation of NATGRID does not take away from the importance of establishing such a body through constitutionally established deliberative processes.  Therefore, the question to be asked is not whether NATGRID is legally or constitutionally valid, but whether it is important for Parliament to oversee the establishment of NATGRID.

In October 2010, the Ministry of Personnel circulated an “Approach paper for a legislation on privacy”.  The paper states: “Data protection can only be ensured under a formal legal system that prescribes the rights of the individuals and the remedies available against the organization that breaches these rights. It is imperative, if the aim is to create a regime where data is protected in this country, that a clear legislation is drafted that spells out the nature of the rights available to individuals and the consequences that an organization will suffer if it breaches these rights.”

As the lines above exemplify, it is important for a robust democracy to codify rights and remedies when such rights may be potentially affected.  The European Union and the USA, along with a host of other countries have comprehensive privacy laws, which also lay down conditions for access to databases, and the limitations of such use.  The UIDAI was established as an executive authority, and still functions without statutory mandate.  However, a Bill seeking to establish the body statutorily has been introduced, and its contents are being debated in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance and the Bill has also been deliberated on by civil society at large.

A similar approach is imperative in the case of NATGRID to uphold the sovereign electorate’s right to oversee institutions that may affect it in the future.

 

The NAC Communal Violence Bill: Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence

June 9th, 2011 6 comments

The National Advisory Committee has recently come out with a Communal Violence Bill.  The Bill is intended to prevent acts of violence, or incitement to violence directed at people by virtue of their membership to any “group”.  An existing Bill titled the “Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005” pending in the Rajya Sabha (analysis here).  The main features of the NAC Bill are explained below:

The Bill makes illegal acts which result in injury to persons or property, if such acts are directed against persons on the basis of their affiliation to any group, and if such an act destroys the secular fabric of the nation.  Such acts include sexual assault, hate propaganda, torture and organized communal violence.

It makes public servants punishable for failing to discharge their stated duties in an unbiased manner.  In addition, public servants have duties such as the duty to provide protection to victims of communal violence and also have to take steps to prevent the outbreak of communal violence.

The Bill establishes a National Authority for Communal Harmony, Justice, and Reparation to prevent acts of communal violence, incitement to communal violence, containing the spread of communal violence, and monitoring investigations into acts of communal violence.  The Authority can also inquire into and investigate acts of communal violence by itself.  The Bill also provides for the setting up of State Authorities for Communal Harmony, Justice, and Reparation.

The central or state government has been given the authority to intercept any messages or transmissions if it feels that it might lead to communal violence.  This power is subject to existing procedures which have to be complied with for intercepting messages and transmissions.

Importantly, if public officers are liable to be prosecuted for offences under the Bill, and prior sanction is required for such prosecution, the state government has to grant or refuse sanction within 30 days.  If not, then sanction will be deemed to have been granted.

The Bill also allows the states to set up one or more Human Rights Defender of Justice and Reparations’ in every district.  The Human Rights defender will ensure that those affected by communal and targeted violence are able to access their rights under existing laws.

Apart from these, the Bill also establishes state and district-level authorities for assessing compensation for victims of communal violence.  States also have numerous obligations towards victims, such as the establishment of relief camps, ensuring proper facilities, medical provisions and clothing for those within such camps, etc.  The states government also has the obligation to create conditions which allow the return of victims of communal violence to the place of their ordinary residence.

 

Does the judiciary “make laws”?

April 20th, 2011 3 comments

A recent case before the Supreme Court has once again highlighted the issue of judicial decisions potentially replacing/ amending legislation enacted by Parliament.  The case importantly pertains to the judiciary’s interpretation of existing law concerning itself.  The eventual outcome of the case would presumably have important implications for the way the higher judiciary interprets laws, which according to some amounts to the judiciary “legislating” rather than interpreting laws.

 

This assertion has often been substantiated by citing cases such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) where the Supreme Court actually laid down the law pertaining to sexual discrimination at workplaces in the absence of a law governing the same.  In numerous other cases, courts have laid down policy guidelines, or have issued administrative directions to governmental departments.

 

In the recent case of Suraz India Trust v. Union of India, a petition has been filed asking the court to reconsider its own judgements regarding the manner of appointment and transfer of judges.  It has been contended that through its judgements in 1994 and 1998 (Advocate on Record Association v. Union of India and Special Reference No. 1 of 1998) the Supreme Court has virtually amended Constitutional provisions, even though amendments to the Constitution can only be done by Parliament.  This question arises since the Constitution provides for the appointment and transfer of judges by the government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.  The two Supreme Court judgements however gave the primary power of appointment and transfer of judges to the judiciary itself.

 

Importantly, one specific question which has been raised is whether the judgements referred to above really amount to amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution.  Another question raised which is relevant to this discussion is whether the interpretation by courts can actually make provisions in the Constitution redundant.

 

In its judgement on the 4th of April, the Supreme Court referred this case to the Chief Justice of India for further directions.  The outcome of this judgement could potentially require the Supreme Court to define the circumstances when it interprets law, and when it “legislates”.  An indication of the Supreme Court’s attitude concerning this issue may be gleaned from the recent speech of the Chief Justice of India, Justice S.H. Kapadia at the M.C. Setalvad lecture.  The CJI unambiguously stated that:

…In many PILs, the courts freely decree rules of conduct for government and public authorities which are akin to legislation. Such exercises have little judicial function in them. Its justification is that the other branches of government have failed or are indifferent to the solution of the problem. In such matters, I am of the opinion that the courts should be circumspect in understanding the thin line between law and governance...”

 

 

Lokpal – A ‘toothless’ tiger?

January 10th, 2011 3 comments

The union government is reportedly considering a legislation to create anti-corruption units both at the centre and the states.

Such institutions were first conceptualized by the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) headed by Morarji Desai in its report published in 1966. It recommended the creation of two independent authorities – the Lokpal at the centre and the Lokayuktas in the states. The first Lokpal Bill was introduced in Parliament in 1968 but it lapsed with the dissolution of Lok Sabha. Later Bills also met a similar fate.

Though the Lokpal could not be created as a national institution, the interest generated led to the enactment of various state legislations. Maharashtra became the first state to create a Lokayukta in 1972. Presently more than 50% of the states have Lokayuktas, though their powers, and consequently their functioning varies significantly across states.

Existing institutional framework

The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) are the two cornerstones of the existing institutional framework. However, the efficacy of the current system has been questioned. [1]

Though the CVC (set up in 1964) is an independent agency directly responsible to the Parliament, its role is advisory in nature. It relies on the CBI for investigation and only oversees the bureaucracy; Ministers and Members of Parliament are out of its purview. Thus, presently there is no authority (other than Parliament itself) with the mandate to oversee actions of political functionaries.

At the state level, similar vigilance and anti-corruption organisations exist, although the nature of these organisations varies across states.

Karnataka Lokayukta Act

The Karnataka Lokayukta is widely considered as the most active among the state anti-corruption units. [1] It was first set up in 1986 under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984.

The Act was recently amended by the state government following the resignation of the Lokayukta, Justice Santosh Hegde. Justice Hegde had been demanding additional powers for the Lokayukta – especially the power to investigate suo-motu. Following the amendment, the Lokayukta has been given the suo motu powers to investigate all public servants except the CM, Ministers, Legislators and those nominated by the government.

Following are the main provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act:

  • The public servants who are covered by the Act include the CM, Ministers, Legislators and all officers of the state government including the heads of bodies and corporations established by any law of the state legislature.
  • The body is constituted for a term of five years and consists of one Lokayukta and one or more Upalokayuktas. All members must have been judges, with either the Supreme Court or some High Court.
  • Members are appointed on the advice of the CM in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court, the Chairman of the Karnataka Legislative Council, the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly, and the Leader of Opposition in both Houses.
  • Investigations involving the CM, Ministers, Legislators and those nominated by the government must be based on written complaints; other public servants can be investigated suo-motu.
  • Reports of  the Lokayukta are recommendatory. It does not have the power to prosecute.

The forthcoming Ordinance/ Bill

Given that a Lokpal Bill is on the anvil, it might be useful at this point to enumerate some metrics/ questions against which the legislation should be tested:

  • Should the Lokpal limit itself to political functionaries? Should CBI and CVC be brought under the Lokpal, thereby creating a single consolidated independent anti-corruption entity?
  • Should Lokpal be restricted to an advisory role? Should it have the power to prosecute?
  • Should it have suo-motu powers to investigate? Would a written complaint always be forthcoming, especially when the people being complained against occupy powerful positions?
  • What should be the composition of the body? Who should appoint members?
  • Should the Prime Minister be exempt from its purview?
  • Should prior permission from the Speaker or the Chairman of the House be required to initiate inquiry against Ministers/ MPs?

What do you think? Write in with your comments.

Notes:

[1] Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), ‘Ethics in Governance’ (2007)

[2] Additional reading: An interview with the Karnataka Lokayukta

Mechanism of voting and recording of votes in Parliament

December 24th, 2010 7 comments

The convention for passing Bills in the Parliament is by orally communicating agreement or disagreement with the proposed motion (whether a Bill should be passed or not, for example). When a motion is put to vote the speaker says, ‘Those in the favour of the motion say Aye and those opposing it say No.’ According to the voice vote, the Speaker decides whether the Bill is accepted or negated by the House.

If a member is not happy with a voice vote, it can be challenged and a division can be asked for. The procedure for division entails the Speaker to announce for the lobbies of Parliament to be cleared. Then the division bell rings continuously for three and a half minutes and so do many connected bells all through Parliament House and Parliament House Annexe. MPs come from all sides into the chamber and the doors are closed. The votes are recorded by the Automatic Vote Recording Equipment.

For example, in the Winter Session of the Parliament, four appropriation bills (financial Bills) were passed by voice vote amidst the interruptions from the opposition and two bills i.e. The Orissa (Alteration of Name) Bill, 2010 and The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirteenth Amendment) Bill, 2010 (Amendment of Eighth Schedule) were passed through division. For these Bills the voting took place together. The votes recorded were: 298 ayes and 0 noes.

Can the Supreme Court ask the government to frame a law?

December 23rd, 2010 4 comments

In a recent case, the Supreme Court directed the appropriate government to enact a law by June 2011.  The case, Gainda Ram & Ors. V. MCD and Ors.[1], concerned the legal framework for regulating hawking in Delhi.  The judgement lays out the background to this case by stating that the regulation of hawking in Delhi had been proceeding under directions issued by the Supreme Court in previous cases, and was being implemented by municipal authorities such as the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC).

The NDMC and the MCD have also framed schemes to regulate hawkers as per a policy of the government framed in 2004.  However, since these schemes were not laid before Parliament, the Court held that these schemes cannot be called ‘law’ or drafted under the authority of any law.  The Court also stated that there is an urgent need to enact a legislation to regulate hawking, and the rights of street vendors.

It referred to a Bill which had been framed by the government, and stated that since the government has already taken the first step in the legislative process by drafting a Bill, the legislative process should be completed.  On the basis of this, and other reasons, it directed the government to enact a law by June 2011.  This judgement raises three issues:

  1. The government is not the law making body in India.  Enacting a law is the function of Parliament and state legislatures.
  2. Even if the Court were to address the correct authority, Courts in India have no authority to direct the legislature to frame a law, let alone specify a time-period.  This may be said to violate the basic principle of “separation of powers” which states that the executive, legislature and judiciary should function independently of each other.  Under the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court and the High Courts have the power to protect fundamental rights and to interpret law.  The Constitution does not give power to Courts to direct the framing of a law.
  3. Persons can be held in contempt of court for not following its directions.  In this case, it is not clear who would be held in contempt for not enacting a law by June 2011.  The Supreme Court can either hold the Speaker of the Parliament in contempt for not enacting a law by the specified date (it is uncertain whether the Court has this power since no such past instance has arisen). Or it can hold the concerned government official in contempt for not enacting the law within the time period specified (the government in this case, having no power to enact a law).

[1] Decided on October 8, 2010

PAC seeks comment on 2G and 3G spectrum allocation

December 23rd, 2010 No comments

The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament has invited suggestions on “Recent Developments in the Telecom Sector including allocation of 2G and 3G Spectrum”.

Comments are invited from experts, associations, individuals, organisations and institutions interested in the matter.

Comments have to be sent in to: Director (PAC&CS), Lok Sabha Secretariat, Room No. 401, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi – 110001 (Ph.: 23034401, 23035236), e-mail: compac@sansad.nic.in. Comments have to be sent in within 15 days.

Are measures to minimize conflict of interest of MPs adequate?

December 21st, 2010 2 comments

In India, one of the common threads that run through many of the corruption scandals is the issue of conflict of interest i.e. public officials taking policy decisions based on their personal interest.  For example, Shashi Tharoor in the IPL controversy or Ashok Chavan in the Adarsh Housing Society scam.

Many countries take measures to minimize conflict of interest of its MPs by regulating membership of parliamentarians in Committees, making it mandatory for them to declare pecuniary interest, and restricting employment both during and after completion of tenure.  For example, the US Senate has a detailed Code of Official Conduct that provides guidelines on conflict of interest.

India also has some measures in place to minimize conflict of interest.  These are codified in the Code of Conduct for Ministers, Code of Conduct for Members of the Rajya Sabha, Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and Handbook for Members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.  Every Rajya Sabha MP has to declare his or her interest (along with assets and liabilities).  He has to declare five pecuniary interests:  remunerative directorship, remunerated activity, majority shareholding, paid consultancy and professional engagement.  Lok Sabha MPs can object to another MP joining a parliamentary committee on grounds that he has personal, pecuniary or direct interest.  (For more details, see PRS note on Conflict of Interest Issues in Parliament).

On December 1, 2010, PRS held its annual Conference on Effective Legislatures.  One of the topics discussed was MPs and Conflict of Interest: Issues and Resolution.  Panelists included D Raja, Prakash Javdekar and Supriya Sule.  Issues such as requirement for transparency, expertise of legislators, election of honest legislators, and ethical media were discussed.  The issues that were raised during the discussion are summarised in the PRS Summary of Proceedings from the Conference.